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Summary 
The ability to choose wisely is crucial for our survival. Yet, the received wisdom has 
been that humans choose irrationally and sub-optimally. This conclusion is largely 
based on studies in which participants are asked to make choices on the basis of explicit 
numerical information. Lately, our ability to make such high-level choices has been 
contrasted with our ability to make low-level (perceptual or perceptuo-motor) choices. 
Remarkably, we seem able to make near-optimal low-level choices. Taken at face value, 
the discrepancy gives rise to a perception-cognition gap. The gap implies, for example, 
that our ancestors were much better at choosing where to put their feet on a rocky ridge 
(a perceptuo-motor task), compared to choosing which prey to hunt (a cognitive 
task).The work reported herein probes this gap. There are many differences between 
literatures showing optimal and sub-optimal performance. The main approach taken 
here was to match low- and high-level tasks as closely as possible to eliminate such 
differences. When this is done one finds very little evidence for a perception-cognition 
gap. Moreover, once the standards of performance assessment of the respective 
literature are applied to data generated under such conditions it becomes apparent that 
the cause of the gap seems to lie in the standards themselves. When low-level standards 
are applied, human choice, whether low- or high-level, looks good. When high-level 
standards are applied, human choice, whether low- or high-level, looks rather poor. It is 
easy to see then, that applying high-level standards to high-level tasks, and low-level 
standards to low-level tasks, will give rise to  a “gap”, with no or little actual difference 
in performance.  
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1. General Introduction 
Many, if not all, of our actions cause outcomes only probabilistically. This implies 
that we cannot decide between possible actions solely on the basis of their values. 
Instead, we have to take both the likelihood and the values of outcomes into account. 
But how should we trade-off values and likelihoods when choosing amongst actions? 
The optimal strategy is to choose the action with the highest expected (subjective) value 
(Bernoulli, 1738/1954, Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944/1955, Savage, 1954/1972). 
The expected value of an outcome is the product of its likelihood and its value. 
Choosing optimally, therefore, entails choosing the action associated with the largest 
value-probability product. 
Decades of research studying human high-level cognitive decisions suggest that 
humans deviate from this optimal choice strategy (Allais, 1952/1979, Ellsberg, 1961, 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1992). Such deviations have 
been found mainly (but not only, see e.g., Fox & Tversky, 1998) using decision tasks in 
which participants are asked to choose between options, for which probabilities and 
values are given in numerical format. As a participant you might, for example, be asked 
to indicate whether you prefer option A: “£4000 with a probability of .8”, or option B: 
“£3000 with certainty” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Asking such questions 
researchers have been able to show that people choose in a manner incompatible with 
the optimal strategy (see “Cognitive [high level] tasks” below).   
When the same normative standards are applied to low-level (perceptuo-motor 
and perceptual) decisions, however, they appear to describe the observed choices very 
well. So well, in fact, that peoples choices can be described as optimal, or near-optimal 
(e.g., Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2003a, 2003b; Whitely & Sahani, 2008; 
Navalpakkam, Koch & Perona, 2009, Navalpakkam, Koch, Rangel & Perona, 2010). 
Thus, there exists a perception-cognition gap: low-level decisions appear optimal and 
high-level decisions appear sub-optimal (Trommershäuser, Landy & Maloney, 2006; 
Maloney, Trommershäuser & Landy, 2007; Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 
2008).  
The main difference between low- and high-level studies is that in the former 
participants are not asked to choose between options with probability information in a 
numerical format. Instead, they are asked to choose between actions, for which the 
probability of success and failure is derived from low-level systems (see “Perceptual, 
perceptuo-motor (low-level) tasks” below). 
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The perception-cognition gap implies, for example, that our ancestors were much 
better at choosing where to put their feet on a rocky ridge (a perceptuo-motor task), 
compared to choosing which prey to hunt (a cognitive task). Why should this be? If one 
is puzzled by this gap, a natural starting point is to try to equate as far as possible low- 
and high-level decisions in order to compare them fairly. This was the main approach 
taken in the work presented here.  
We begin by discussing briefly general questions that a reader may have at this 
point: Why is expected (subjective) value maximization optimal? How can one think of 
the perceptual system as making decisions? What exactly are cognitive and perceptual 
decisions? How have researchers determined whether their participants adhere to the 
optimal strategy? And so on...  
 
1.1 The normative status of decision theory 
Why is choosing the option with the highest expected (subjective) value 
considered to be the optimal strategy? There are two main arguments for its normative 
status: axiomatic and long-run performance arguments. The long run argument is 
perhaps the most intuitive. An agent who chooses the option that has the highest 
average value will, by definition, do at least as well on average as other agents 
employing any other strategy. So, if you want to do as well as conceivably possible 
across your lifetime, you should make choices that maximize expected value. One 
problem with this formulation is that it is not clear that it generalises to the case when 
you choose only once (or sufficiently infrequently for the law of large numbers to 
apply) – specifically, the fact that the expected value of a particular action is positive 
will not console the person who has just lost everything (Jensen, 1967).  
Axiomatic developments do not rely on the law of large numbers, but start from a 
set of rules. From such rules, or axioms, a decision theoretic framework prescribing 
how a person who wishes to abide by these axioms should act can be developed. There 
exist many axiomatic developments (e.g., Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1955; Savage, 
1972). Introductions to decision theory tend to describe 3-4 axioms (e.g., Jensen, 1967; 
Berger, 1985, Parmigiani & Inoue, 2009).  
Berger’s (1985) description includes four axioms. Axiom 1 requires that one must 
have a full set of preferences: either you prefer A to B, B to A or you are indifferent 
between A and B. In other words, for any two options you either prefer one or the other, 
or you are indifferent between the two. Axiom 2 requires that your preferences are 
transitive: if you prefer A to B, and B to C, you will also prefer A to C. Put differently; 
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if you prefer a banana to an apple and an apple to a pear you will prefer a banana to a 
pear. Axiom 3 states that if you prefer A to B then you prefer a probabilistic mixture of 
A to the same probabilistic mixture of B. To be precise, for any probability p you prefer 
pA+(1-p)C, where C is a new option,  to pB+(1-p)C. That is, adding C to B and adding 
C to A will not change your preferences. Axiom 4 states that there are no infinitely bad 
or good outcomes: if you prefer A to B and B to C, there will be some probabilities (α, 
β) such that B is preferred to αA + (1-α)C, and such that βA + (1-β)C is preferred to B. 
If you behave in accord with these axioms you will be maximizing expected utility, but 
why should you behave according to the axioms? That is, why is it rational to maximize 
expected utility in the manner prescribed by the axioms? 
Typically, justifications for behaving as the axioms prescribe can be given by 
appeal to desirability. For example, if your preferences are not transitive (Axiom 2 
above) you can be turned into a money pump. You may prefer a banana to an apple, an 
apple to a pear, but a pear to a banana. With those preferences, we can sell you an apple 
for a pear and a little money (e.g., £.10). We can then sell you a banana for the apple we 
have just sold you and a little money. Because you prefer a pear to a banana we can now 
give you back your pear and receive a little money plus the banana. If we repeat this 
procedure you would soon be without money.  
Nevertheless, the normative status of decision theory has been challenged. Some 
critiques are aimed at the normative status of decision theory itself. Searle (2001), for 
example, argues that he would never wager his life against twenty-five cents, no matter 
how small the likelihood of death (i.e., he does not approve of Axiom 4 above). Searle’s 
argument may seem compelling at first. However it is worth putting the example into 
the perspective of everyday life. Just by getting out of bed, driving a car, exercising, 
cooking food, in short by living ones ordinary life one constantly exposes oneself to 
substantial risks (that have low potential payoffs).  
Do you really need to go on holiday for example? No? Are there additional risks 
associated with going on holiday that you would otherwise not be exposed to? 
Remember it does not matter how small those risks are – as long as your life is at risk. 
Searle’s argument implies that you would never go on holiday (as e.g., air travel is 
associated with an additional small risk of death) – yet many people do go on holiday, 
suggesting that Searle’s argument cannot be quite right.  
A few challenges pertain to whether decision theory is a reasonable standard for 
human behaviour. These are typically based around the idea that being “optimal” 
requires full knowledge and that the theory quickly becomes intractable under such 
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conditions (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). We do not consider such arguments particularly 
damaging to the theory’s use here for three reasons. Firstly, one does not need to 
assume that someone who acts according to decision theory is an all-seeing all-powerful 
agent. One simply needs to assume that the agent chooses according to decision theory 
on the basis of the information that is available to it in its environment (i.e., is 
statistically optimal). Secondly, issues of computational tractability are often bound to 
specific algorithmic implementations. Even if decision theory were computationally 
intractable, given a specific task with a specific knowledge set, it might still be 
approximated by heuristics. More importantly, in the current context, we do not 
consider issues of tractability relevant to decision theory’s status as a normative 
framework, and therefore whether it can, or should, be applied to human behaviour. In 
other words, whether or not humans can be expected to be able to choose the best action 
is orthogonal to the issue of whether they do choose the best action (or not).  
 We note that decision theory is a normative theory that might not apply directly 
in some specific contexts. It is, for example, only normative for so called games against 
nature. Games against nature are choice situations in which one does not face an 
adversary – hence against nature. When an adversary is present, and there is 
competition for resources, the normative theory needs to be extended to take into 
account the fact that actions of one agent might affect other agents (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1953).  
Similarly, standard decision theory typically assumes that utilities are state-
independent. This means that your preferences for certain outcomes are independent 
from the state that you are in. For example, if one prefers cappuccino to tea then strictly 
speaking one always prefers cappuccino to tea. However, one might, for example, 
imagine a scenario in which ones preference for caffeine-containing drinks was related 
to caffeine blood-levels, such that for higher blood-levels, drinks lower in caffeine are 
preferred. In the same way that decision theory has been extended to account for 
competitive choice, it has also been extended to allow for state-dependent utilities 
(Arrow, 1973; Karni, Schmeidler & Vind, 1983).  
Although both the mentioned extensions seem entirely reasonable they make the 
theory more complex. Because the perception-cognition gap arises in situations which 
do not require state-dependent utilities or competition amongst decision makers 
(compare e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a and Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), we do 
not deal with either here. Moreover, up until this point, we have used “subjective” in 
brackets, when discussing value maximization, to denote the fact that the standard 
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framework allows subjective values (utilities) to differ from objective values. This 
aspect of decision theory was introduced to account for diminishing marginal utility of 
money and has been given normative grounding (e.g., Bernoulli, 1738/1954). 
Diminishing marginal utility is intuitive; £100 when one has £100 000 in the bank will 
be perceived as less valuable compared to £100 when one has £10 in the bank. Here, 
however, we will restrict ourselves to expected value maximization as outlined next. 
Recently, Rabin (Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001) has argued convincingly 
that value preferences should be linear over quite a large range of values in order for the 
theory plausibly to claim normative status. Here we will be concerned with values 
considerably lower than those considered by Rabin, and will be concerned with 
quantities that have monotonic relationships with real money (points in experimental 
tasks).  
Moreover, the low-level decision literature has typically used expected value 
maximization as a normative standard. As it is a stricter criterion of optimality than 
expected utility maximization, and it is generally used in low-level studies (e.g., 
Trommershäuser et al, 2003a, Whitely & Sahani, 2008), it seems an appropriate 
benchmark reference when comparing across low- and high-level decision tasks. For 
these reasons, we will from this point onwards use expected objective value 
maximization as the normative standard. This also simplifies estimation of optimal 
strategies considerably as one does not have to estimate peoples’ value weighting 
function.  
 
1.2  The universal applicability of decision theory 
When people think about decision-making, they are likely to think about high-
level, effortful and conscious choices. They might think, for example, about deciding 
which of several houses to purchase or about deciding how to invest savings. However, 
decision theory can be applied much more broadly. In principle, it can be applied to any 
system or organism that can “select” amongst two or more actions.1  
Anderson (1990), for example, shows that human categorization, human memory, 
and human problem solving can be thought of as solving the problem of  minimizing a 
                                                     
1
 We eschew here the tricky philosophical issues of free will and determinism. We assume merely that for 
most actions organisms in general, and humans especially, have two or more actions from which they can 
“select”. Whether this selection process is in some sense “free” or fully determined is for the purposes of 
determining whether or not a system behaves in accord with decision theory irrelevant. For example, an 
animal may have in its behavioural repertoire fight and flight responses. The animal’s ability to engage 
fight and flight responses in exactly the right situations is orthogonal to whether these behavioural 
responses are in some sense “free” or pre-determined (since the beginning of time).  
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cost function that takes into account both uncertainty and values. Furthermore, the 
ability of organisms to make choices has been studied for a wide range of behaviours 
and organisms, from the foraging behaviour of birds (Pompilio & Kacelnik, 2010) to the 
paths amoeba “choose” to take (Nakagaki, Yamada & Toth, 2000). In short, anything 
that offers an organism or a system more than one “option” can be analysed from a 
decision theoretic perspective.  
In fact, it might be argued that decision theory should be applied this broadly. An 
example in point is the traditional distinction in psychology between judgment and 
decision-making (e.g., Feldman, 2006). The reason for this distinction is presumably 
that judgments are viewed as passive estimates about some property of the world, 
whereas decisions are assumed to involve choosing among possible future states of the 
world (perhaps on the basis of underlying judgments). However, the idea that judgments 
are passive can be criticised. It can be argued that judgments generally are for 
something. That wider purpose will determine the cost function (see e.g., Berger, 1985, 
and see Harris, Corner & Hahn, 2009 for empirical evidence that people are sensitive to 
this). For example, if you need to judge the width of a stream in order to jump over it, 
underestimating the width is more costly than overestimating it. On the other hand, if 
you and a friend compete about who can provide the most accurate width estimate, 
underestimation and overestimation are equally costly.  
In other words, systems or organisms generally perform actions for reasons. 
Reasons determine, jointly with the environment, the cost function. Neglecting this 
seems to at best be harmless (e.g., when the implicitly assumed cost function is the 
correct one), and at worst may produce misleading results (e.g., when the implicitly 
assumed cost function does not match the one participants have).  
 
1.3 Shortcuts to (good) decisions 
It was noted that decisions involve taking into account both probabilities and 
values. Above, we suggested that any system or organism could, and perhaps should, be 
analysed from a decision theoretic perspective. This may seem odd. It might seem 
preposterous to suppose that, for example, amoebae have access to separate estimates of 
values and probabilities and can combine them as decision theory suggest that they 
should. The application of decision theory to these simple organisms might therefore be 
viewed as misguided.  
An alternative view is that the mere application of decision theory to study a 
system does not also imply a particular algorithmic implementation of decision theory 
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(in that system). Instead, decision theory can be used as a normative standard. As such, 
it can be used to chart the efficiency of systems and organism regardless of the 
algorithms and mechanisms that underlie their behaviour. 
In fact, in many situations there is no need for an organism to represent values and 
probabilities separately. Or, for that matter, to weight explicitly values and probabilities 
- regardless of whether the organism is a human or a rat. If an animal is given the 
opportunity to experience outcomes, it can instead learn which of several options it 
prefers.  
There are many such reinforcement learning algorithms (see e.g., Sutton & Barto, 
1998), which although not proven to converge, tend to converge on the optimal solution 
(in the sense that they maximize expected reward) given sufficient experience. That is, 
an organism can be well described by decision theory despite not explicitly operating 
according to its principles (i.e., combining separate estimates of value and probability 
multiplicatively).  
It seems important therefore to distinguish decisions that are made in 
environments where such learning is possible from decisions that de facto have to be 
based on estimates of probabilities and values - because no such learning could 
reasonably have taken place. The ruling out of learning strategies is particularly 
important in the current context where we wish to compare high-level decisions to low-
level decisions. Classical high-level cognitive studies of decision-making do not 
typically allow participants the possibility to take such short-cuts.  
In classical cognitive studies, participants instead receive descriptions of 
probabilities and values and have to make hypothetical decisions on the basis of these 
descriptions. They receive no feedback and cannot therefore learn which option is the 
better one. To pick the optimal option, they have to combine the values and 
probabilities in an optimal manner. Studies of perceptual and perceptuo-motor 
decisions, however, typically do provide feedback. A trivial explanation for the 
perception-cognition gap, therefore, is that performance in low-level studies is good 
because people are given feedback and poor in high-level studies because they are not. 
Can optimal perceptuo-motor, or perceptual, decisions be explained away as a 
result of a simple learning process? Some studies explicitly model learning (e.g., 
Navalpakkam et al., 2009). The authors of these studies are presumably not worried 
about ruling out learning strategies, but apply decision theory in the same way it can be 
applied to rats or amoebae. However, many recognize the challenges posed by 
alternative explanations based on learning algorithms. Whitely & Sahani (2008), for 
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example, offered their participants only intermittent feedback to minimize the 
possibility that participants might gradually home in on an optimum. Similarly, 
Trommershäuser et al. (2003a) argued that learning cannot explain their results as A) 
the individual data shows no gradual improvement across time and B) when the task 
changed, participants seemed to immediately find the new optima and did not have to 
go through an exploratory phase of gradual improvement (as expected from a system 
that learns). The latter method was later developed as a more general test of optimal 
performance (Bayesian transfer, Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). Nevertheless, learning 
may be rapid and learnt solutions may generalise across conditions. Thus, if one wants 
to compare performance for low-level decisions to performance in paradigms where 
learning is not possible (classical decision tasks) it seems prudent to eliminate feedback 
entirely.  
In the first study presented here, we explore perceptuo-motor performance and 
therefore provide feedback as is typical in these paradigms (see e.g., Trommershäuser et 
al., 2003a,b). In later studies, however, we avoid feedback to ensure that we are 
studying decision-making in the classical sense (and not the learning of the setting of 
decision criteria through feedback).  
 
1.4 Tasks underlying the perception-cognition gap 
1.4.1 Cognitive (high-level) tasks 
Since its inception, expected value/utility theory has been tested by asking people 
to consider hypothetical choices between options. A common format is to offer the 
choice between two options, A1 and B1 (from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): 
 
Table 1.1. Example of a standard choice problem in the classical literature.  
A1   B1 
£ p EV EU 
 
£ p EV EU 
4000 0.80 3200 51 
 
3000 1 3000 55 
 
As a participant, you receive only the information in the first two columns under 
each option: the monetary value of each option (£) and the probability of the realisation 
of the monetary value (p).  
If you are like most people, you would choose B1. As the EV column shows this 
choice violates expected value theory ( EV(A1)=3200 > EV(B1)=3000 ). It does not, 
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however, violate expected utility theory. If you are allowed to weight your values, by 
say using a logarithmic value function (e.g., v(x) = x
a
, where a = .5), you are considered 
optimal when choosing this option ( EU(A1)=51 < EU(B1)=55 ).  
However, demonstrations of irrational choice in the classical literature do not 
typically rely on such single choices, but on juxtaposing options, such as the one just 
presented, with another set of options (for a more recent example of this approach see 
Birnbaum, 2008). 
 
Table 1.2. Example of a standard pair of choice problems in the classical literature. 
A1   B1 
£ p EV EU 
 
£ p EV EU 
4000 0.80 3200 51 
 
3000 1 3000 55 
         A2   B2 
£ p EV EU 
 
£ p EV EU 
4000 0.20 800 13 
 
3000 0.25 750 14 
 
The second option-pair – A2 and B2 – is illustrated in Table 1.2 above. If you are 
like most people, you would choose A2 here. On its own, this choice is consistent with 
expected value maximization. However, if we apply the same weighting we applied 
previously in order to capture people’s choices for the first pair (A1 & B1), we see that 
you should have chosen B2. Thus, your choice pattern is inconsistent – both when 
evaluated by the expected value and by the expected utility maximization norms. If you 
behaved as either an expected value or an expected utility maximizer you could not 
have these preferences. In terms of axiomatic expected utility theory your choice pattern 
violates the independence axiom (Axiom 3 above).  
Using this method of juxtaposing choices across pairs of options, researchers have 
developed many combinations of options for which people’s preference patterns violate 
axioms of expected utility theory. The implied logic is as follows: if it can be shown 
that people have preferences that systematically violate expected utility theory they 
cannot be said to make choices in accord with the same theory - and are therefore sub-
optimal.  
Note that classical studies employing the above paradigm have mainly used 
between-subject methodology, have not provided feedback, and have not involved real 
payoffs (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We view the absence of feedback as an 
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important strength of this paradigm. Nevertheless, when feedback is provided, 
performance often improves (e.g., Chu & Chu, 1990; Shanks, Tunney & McCarthy 
2002; Jessup, Bishara & Busemeyer, 2008). This suggests that people can learn to make 
less sub-optimal choices if given the opportunity to do so. In other words, it suggests 
that really irrational behaviour might be less likely to persist in the real world where 
feedback is often available (but for an example of apparently irrational decision-making 
in the presence of feedback see the decision from experience literature, e.g., Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009).  
Classical studies have been criticized for the lack of real payoffs. As a participant, 
you are asked to choose the option you would prefer. However, your choices are of no 
consequence to you. As a relatively disinterested participant, you may not be willing to 
invest the mental effort required to make wise choices (e.g., Smith, 1976) on the basis 
of inconsequential word problems. Recently, it has even been suggested that effort 
should be explicitly incorporated in theories of choice (Dickhaut, Rustichini & Smith, 
2009). This critique presupposes that if sufficient cognitive effort were induced, for 
example by making choices consequential, decisions would no longer show deviations 
from optimality. The evidence for better performance with increased payoffs however is 
mixed (see e.g., Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001 for reviews). In 
brief, although some deviations from optimality may be avoided when actions are 
consequential, it is far from clear that all or even most deviations cease to exist for 
(large) real potential payoffs. 
 
1.4.2  Perceptual and perceptuo-motor (low-level) tasks 
As noted initially, the main difference between low- and high-level decision tasks 
is that participants have to use their lower-level systems (perceptual and perceptuo-
motor) in the former to inform their decision making. However, this is not the only way 
in which the decision making paradigms differ. The low-level studies that have been 
used to contrast people’s ability to make low-level decisions with their ability to make 
high-level decisions (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2006) also differ from high-level 
studies in how adherence to optimal standards is assessed and in the method by which 
decision-making is studied.  
Fig. 1.1 illustrates a typical low-level paradigm. Because the perceptuo-motor 
system is noisy, speeded pointing towards a target will result in responses dispersed 
around the chosen aim point (cross, Panel A, Fig. 1.1). In Trommershäuser et al.’s 
(2003a, 2003b) paradigm, participants point under time pressure towards stimulus 
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configurations (Panel B) with the goal of earnings as many points as possible. 
Participants accrue points if they hit a reward region (full line, Panel B), lose points if 
they hit a penalty region (dashed line, Panel B), and receive both if they hit the 
intersection of both regions. Different aim points (different symbols, Panel B) will 
result in different probabilities of hitting each region (hit probabilities, Panel C).  
Different hit probabilities, in turn, will result in different number of points earned. 
Given that there are many aim points, participants are in effect choosing between 
many different options of the form: reward with p = X, penalty with p = Y, both reward 
and penalty with p = Z – which is easily recognized as a classical decision-making 
problem (see e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). As is evident however, the choice in 
Trommershäuser et al.’s paradigm (2003a) is not a binary one – between two choice 
options – but a choice along a continuous scale: the x and y position of the aim point. 
To fulfil the task goal of earning as many points as possible, participants have to choose 
the aim point with the highest expected value.  
Note that participants have to use knowledge derived through the perceptuo-motor 
system in order to make their decisions. That is, the probability information is not 
provided as numbers on a piece of paper as in the classical tasks, but must be derived 
from low-level systems. In this example, participants have to assess how likely they are 
to hit each region given specific aim points. Note also that the value information, 
however, is given in abstract form just like in the classical paradigm.  
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Fig. 1.1. Perceptuo-motor gambles and performance assessment. Panel A: A simulated 
response distribution (grey discs) from one participant (σ2 = 14.78, Participant 2, Exp. 2, 
in Trommershäuser et al., 2003a) aiming at the centre of a target (cross, Panel A). Panel 
B: Example of one stimulus configuration and reward structure employed by 
Trommershäuser et al., with example aim points (symbols) and region-specific rewards 
and penalties (numbers). Panel C: Hit probabilities for the aim points in panel B. Panel 
D: Efficiencies (expected gain normalized by optimal expected gain) for the aim points 
in panel B. The optimal aim point (circle, Panel B), has an efficiency of 1.The 
horizontal line represents the lower 95 percentile of optimal performance. Efficiencies 
below this line are lower than expected by chance and hence sub-optimal. 
 
To assess participants’ performance, in paradigms such as the one just outlined, 
researchers typically use ideal observer methods. The idea is to compare participants’ 
performance to the performance of a hypothetical participant who performs the task 
optimally.  Performing the task optimally means to, given the available knowledge, 
make the best possible choices. The best aim-point choice - the choice that returns the 
maximum amount of points (and therefore money) - is the disc in Panel B.  
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Participants’ choices can be compared to the optimal ones. Consider, for example, 
the upwards-facing triangle in Panel B, which represents a participant who is a little too 
careful and aims further away from the penalty region than optimal. This aim point will 
on average return a sizable fraction of the optimal agent’s earnings. Panel D shows the 
different efficiencies associated with the various aim points in Panel B. Efficiency is a 
given participants’ earnings proportional to the earnings of the corresponding optimal 
agent; an efficiency of 1 means that the participant is precisely optimal and efficiencies 
below 1 means that they perform worse than optimal.  
Of course, given a limited sample size, and given the noise in the perceptuo-motor 
system, even an optimal agent is unlikely to achieve an efficiency of 1 for a particular 
experiment. To take this noise into account and to evaluate statistically whether 
particular choices can be said to deviate from the optimal ones bootstrap/Monte Carlo 
methods are used (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a). 
Because a model of how the task should be performed is available (the ideal 
agent), optimal agents performing a particular experiment many times over can be 
simulated. Such simulations lead to distributions of optimal earnings. These 
distributions can then be used to infer whether a particular participant’s earnings are 
significantly different from that of a hypothetical participant performing the experiment 
optimally. Typically, the lower 2.5 percentile of the optimal earnings is taken as a cut-
off for optimal performance (see e.g., Trommershäuser, Gepshtein, Maloney, Landy & 
Banks, 2005). This lower threshold for characterizing participants as optimal is 
illustrated in Fig 1.1 D by the horizontal line. In our example two of the three aim points 
(cross & upwards-facing triangle, Panel D) result in efficiencies above the lower 2.5 
percentile of the optimal efficiency and are thus classed as optimal. 
 
1.5 Differences between low- and high-level paradigms 
The just outlined paradigm is different from the classical cognitive paradigm in 
that it offers the possibility of learning the optimal strategy (through feedback), offers 
many repeated choices between the same options (one target-reward configuration is 
considered as one option), typically offers more than two choice options and offers 
consequential choice (participant payment is contingent upon performance). Any of 
these differences, individually or jointly, could potentially explain the perception-
cognition gap. In the following, we will seek to minimize these differences by studying 
perceptuo-motor, perceptual and cognitive choices under precisely matched conditions.  
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The low level approach also differs in important ways from the classical paradigm 
with regard to how performance is assessed. As discussed above, the classical paradigm 
uses carefully tailored sets of choices, across which particular choice patterns indicate 
violations of fundamental axioms of decision theory. By contrast, perceptuo-motor 
studies compare actual earnings to the earnings achieved by someone who chooses in 
accord with decision theory. Consequently the perception-cognition gap could also be 
due to differences in how performance is assessed. For example, people’s good 
performance in low-level tasks may be a result of them using choice strategies that only 
approximate the optimal ones. If the approximation is sufficiently good, however, then 
performance will not be classed as statistically different from optimal. This would be an 
interesting result in itself, and would suggest that the view of human cognition as 
severely flawed (e.g., Sutherland, 2007) is an exaggeration. Indeed, such a result might 
be taken to suggest that violations shown in cognitive studies are relatively harmless. 
In the first two chapters we use the low-level approach of evaluating actual 
performance exclusively. However, in the third chapter, we use both types of 
performance evaluation across precisely matched low- and high-level tasks. This 
allowed us to empirically evaluate the idea that the gap might be due to the application 
of different performance standards.  
 
1.6 The perception-cognition gap explored 
We began our exploration of the perception-cognition gap with a study of 
perceptuo-motor decision-making (Chapter 2). Our task was based on a standard 
perceptuo-motor decision-making paradigm (Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 2003b). 
Under time pressure, participants tried to hit targets by pointing at them. They received 
feedback (points like in computer games) and were paid as a function of how well they 
did. We manipulated target distance and target size in a first exploration of these factors 
in the perceptuo-motor decision literature. 
As typical in perceptuo-motor decision studies, participants had to choose an aim 
point for each stimulus configuration – an “implicit” choice. We added a more cognitive 
“explicit” choice to the task. On each trial participants were presented with two targets: 
a small and a large one. Thus, in addition to deciding where to aim on a particular 
target, they had to decide which of the two targets to aim for. To decide well, 
participants had to take into account their own perceptuo-motor uncertainty, the distance 
to each target and the size of each target (all three factors determining the likelihood 
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with which targets can be hit) together with the rewards of hitting the targets (the small 
target was always worth more than the large).  
We initially thought that adding a more “cognitive” component to a perceptuo-
motor task might make perceptuo-motor decisions more like those in the cognitive 
domain – sub-optimal. We did not find quite what we expected. The results did indicate 
that participants did not optimize two performance-related metrics (precision and time 
usage). More importantly from the perspective of the overall goal here: simulations and 
comparisons across our studies demonstrate that optimality depends on task difficulty. 
Thus, the standard analysis employed in perceptuo-motor decision-making experiments 
seemingly fails to provide an absolute standard of performance. It is therefore unclear 
how different domains can be compared. This, in conjunction with non-trivial 
evaluative and methodological differences, was a first indication that comparative 
claims favouring perceptuo-motor, or perceptual, systems over higher-level cognitive 
systems might be premature.  
In the absence of an absolute standard of performance, we sought to find way in 
which we could compare performance across domains without confounding 
performance with task difficulty. That is, we wanted to rule out, as far as possible, the 
possibility that differences in performance were due to, for example, cognitive tasks 
being more “difficult” than perceptual tasks. The idea behind our next set of 
experiments (Chapter 4) was to use a decision task that might be viewed as modality 
independent, thus minimizing the potential for the chosen decision problem to be more 
or less suited to a particular system. One such task is making decisions about how much 
time to spend.  
To decide how much time to spend on a given task wisely, you need to know how 
costly it is to get the task wrong, how rewarding it is to get it right, and how your task 
performance changes as a function of how much time you spend on the task. 
Importantly, it is a type of decision that we make for low- as well as high-level tasks.  
We first investigated timing decisions when the underlying task was perceptual. 
Decisions were highly efficient and suggested that people can make good use of 
perceptual knowledge and abstract reward information. We then compared timing 
decisions for the perceptual task to timing decisions for more cognitive tasks. 
Performance was highly similar, suggesting that knowledge can be acquired, and used 
to make timing decisions, in an equally efficient way regardless of whether the 
knowledge is derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.   
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Although the results of Chapter 4 showed that cognition can be as good as 
perception they left open the possibility that the equal performance shown was due to 
the domain in which participants made decisions. Decision about time might be special. 
Moreover, although we used two cognitive tasks neither included numerical probability 
information as is typical in classical cognitive studies. The next line of work we present 
(Chapter 6) was designed to address these two potential issues.  
The study reported on in Chapter 6 also allowed us to address another decision 
making gap: the description-experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 
2010). In classical tasks with numerical probabilities and values participants overweight 
low probabilities. In contrast, when participants can learn values and probabilities low 
probabilities are underweighted: the description-experience gap. However, as for the 
perception-cognition gap, confounds between tasks makes comparisons difficult.  
Avoiding the typical confounds, we compared choices across three precisely 
matched tasks: a classical decision task with numerical information and two tasks for 
which the numerical probability information was replaced with equivalent low-level 
(perceptuo-motor) and high-level (mental arithmetic) information. Comparisons across 
the three tasks suggests A) that the perception-cognition gap is illusory and due to 
differences in how performance is assessed, B) that the description-experience gap is 
due to the assumption that objective probabilities match subjective ones (and/or due to 
learning in decision from experience studies), C) that deviations from optimality 
observed in classical decision-making studies might not be particularly costly and 
finally D) that individual differences are more important for predicting peoples’ choices 
than the type of decision people face.   
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2. Are Perceptuo-Motor Decisions Really More Optimal Than 
Cognitive Decisions?
2
 
As noted in General Introduction, there appears to be a striking dissociation 
between human perceptuo-motor- and cognitive decision-making performance. 
Normative decision theory poorly describes cognitive decision-making (Birnbaum, 
2008; Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Perceptuo-
motor decision-making, on the other hand, appears well described by the same theory 
(for a review see Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2008; see Whiteley & Sahani, 
2008 for a similar conclusion in a perceptual domain). This apparent dissociation has 
been highlighted repeatedly. Trommershäuser, Landy and Maloney, for example, note 
that “... in marked contrast to the grossly sub-optimal performance of human subjects in 
traditional economic decision-making experiments, our subjects’ performance was often 
indistinguishable from optimal.” (2006, p. 987; see also e.g., Maloney, Trommershäuser 
& Landy, 2007; Trommershäuser et al., 2008).  
This performance dissociation is puzzling. Few reasons are evident for why 
perceptuo-motor decision-making should be optimal, while cognitive decision-making 
is sub-optimal (but see e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Evans & Over, 1996). 
Furthermore, little progress appears to have been made in explaining the difference.  
There are at least three possible sources for the apparent dissociation: 1) 
competence may be modality dependent 2) performance may be task dependent and 3) 
differences may result from the way performance is evaluated. If competence were 
indeed modality dependent this would be a striking finding. However, as pointed out by 
Trommershäuser and colleagues (e.g., Maloney et al., 2007), the employed experimental 
paradigms differ along a number of methodological dimensions. Perceptuo-motor 
studies generally involve repeated decisions with outcome feedback and internalized 
probabilities. Cognitive decision tasks, on the other hand, generally involve one-shot 
decisions without feedback and exact probabilities stated on paper (see e.g., Birnbaum, 
2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, but see e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004; 
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997). Thus, a less interesting explanation is 
that one, or many, of these methodological differences give rise to the apparent 
dissociation.  
Not only are there methodological differences, performance is also evaluated 
differently in the two fields. Although both perceptuo-motor and cognitive studies draw 
                                                     
2
 A version of this chapter is under review in Cognition. A pilot study with a similar experimental design 
was submitted for partial fulfilment of a Master’s degree in Research Methods.  
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on normative theories to provide performance standards, adherence to these norms is 
assessed in different ways. Generally, the perceptual, and perceptuo-motor, literature 
asks how closely human performance matches that of an ideal agent (see e.g., Barlow, 
1962; Geisler, 2003; Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 2003b). Broadly, an ideal agent is a 
model that performs a given task maximally well. Constraints under which the system is 
assumed to operate are typically built into the model. The cognitive literature, on the 
other hand, typically asks if a system violates some (or many) of the principles of 
normative theories (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008; Hertwig, et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Experiments are designed so that certain response patterns will violate 
fundamental axioms of decision theory. Thus, assessment of performance differs in two 
ways: absence3 versus presence of system constraints and qualitative versus quantitative 
violations of normative theories (but see Wu, Delgado & Maloney, 2009 for an attempt 
at equating tasks across domains). 
Given the just outlined non-trivial differences between cognitive and perceptuo-
motor studies, comparisons of human performance across the two domains need to be 
made with care. Here we highlight difficulties associated with such comparisons using 
two perceptuo-motor decision-making experiments. The experiments demonstrate that 
minor changes in task parameters, changes which do not impact on an optimal 
participant’s performance, influence whether participants are viewed as optimal or sub-
optimal. We follow up these empirical results by illustrating, through simulations, how 
specific changes in task parameters can cause participants hitherto classified as optimal 
to be classed as sub-optimal. The experiments also suggest that people’s perceptuo-
motor decisions are sub-optimal in ways not captured by Trommershäuser et al.’s 
(2003a, 2003b) model. Together these results, we think, suggest that claims of greater 
optimality for perceptual systems over higher-level cognitive systems may be 
premature.  
 
2.1 Experimental investigation 
Using the perceptuo-motor paradigm outlined in Chapter 1: Perceptual, 
perceptuo-motor (low level) tasks, or variants thereof, Trommershäuser, Maloney and 
                                                     
3
 Studies of higher-level decision-making and judgment typically are not concerned with constraints when 
evaluating participant performance. Instead it is assumed that the paradigm employed is sufficiently easy, 
so that any system that adheres to the studied axioms is able to perform the necessary computations 
(Evans, 1993). This is not to say that constraints have gone unstudied. Kahneman and Tversky (1996), for 
example, have argued that when extensional cues are given to participants, performance improves. This 
effect is presumed due to extensional cues triggering a slow and effortful processing system that would 
otherwise not have been used (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
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Landy have explored perceptuo-motor decision-making extensively (see 
Trommershäuser et al., 2008). We were initially interested in one of the distinctions 
they make: that of implicit and explicit decisions. Seydell, McCann, Trommershäuser 
and Knill (2008) note that cognitive paradigms generally involve explicit choices 
(introspectively one is aware of choosing), whilst perceptuo-motor paradigms generally 
involve implicit decisions (introspectively one is unaware of choosing).  
Trommershäuser et al. have previously explored the explicit/implicit choice dimension 
in two studies (Trommershäuser et al., 2006; Seydell et al., 2008) – and concluded that 
explicit as well as implicit motor choice is optimal, or near-optimal.  
In our experiments (illustrated in Fig. 2.1, see Methods below for details) 
designed to explore this distinction further, participants made two choices per trial: an 
aim point choice (“implicit”) and a target choice (“explicit”). All pointing movements 
originated from a dock (white disc) and targets were displayed at different distances. On 
each trial, participants had to choose whether to attempt to hit a small or a large target. 
Hitting a target incurred a reward (the small target was always worth more than the 
large target) and missing a target incurred a penalty. The task goal was to earn as many 
points as possible. To earn as many points as possible, participants had to trade off the 
probability of hitting each target with its associated values. Target hit probabilities 
depended on participants aim point choices, their motor variability, the size of the 
target, and the distance to the target.  
 
 
Fig 2.1. Design of Experiment 1 & 2. Crosses indicate potential target locations. Grey 
discs represent one possible target configuration. The white disc represents the dock 
from which all movements originated. The reward for hitting the large target was 50 in 
Experiment 1 and 75 in Experiment 2. In both experiments, the reward for the small 
target was 100 points, and the penalty for missing either target was -25. Note: targets 
are not drawn to scale.  
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A novel aspect of our study was that the expected gain (the number of points you 
would expect to receive on average when trying to hit a target) of each target depended 
on the size of the target as well as its distance to the dock (Fitts, 1954; Schmidt, 
Zelaznik, Hawkins, Frank & Quinn, 1979). Thus, a basic question was whether humans 
are able to trade off these quantities in an optimal manner when making perceptuo-
motor choices.  
The use of two target sizes also enabled an indirect assessment of one the 
assumptions built into Trommershäuser et al.’s model (2003a, 2003b), namely the 
assumption that motor error is unconditionally minimized. This assumption is critical 
for previous studies for two reasons. Firstly, it is a basic building block of 
Trommershäuser et al.’s (2003a) model and other models of motor planning (e.g., 
Harris & Wolpert, 1998). Secondly, it is important as the assumption that motor error is 
minimized is carried through to the modelling of optimal choice and hence the 
evaluation of participant performance.  
Previous studies have also probed the question of human time allocation in 
perceptuo-motor tasks. The general conclusion has, again, been that time allocation is 
optimal or near-optimal (e.g., Battaglia & Schrater, 2007; Dean, Wu & Maloney, 2007; 
Hudson, Maloney & Landy, 2008). However, in these past studies participants were 
explicitly instructed to optimize time usage. Consequently, this does not answer the 
question of whether the perceptuo-motor system optimizes time in general.  
Relevant to the latter issue is the study of Gepshtein et al. (2007).  This study 
employed near and far targets and a fixed response time and it found that participants 
reached faster to near targets than to far targets – even when the same amount of 
response time was available for both distances. In other words, participants did not 
maximize time use for near targets. The speed-accuracy trade-off (Fitts, 1954; Schmidt 
et al., 1979) describes the inverse relationship between pointing precision and 
movement speed: the faster the movement the lower the precision. Given this trade-off, 
it appears that participants’ failure to maximize time usage for near targets resulted in 
decrease in precision and potentially a decrease in rewards obtained. As Gepshtein et 
al.’s results suggest that time allocation in motor responding may not be optimal 
without specific, explicit instruction, further examination seems important.   
We conducted two experiments with the task just outlined. The task parameters 
differed across Experiment 1 and 2. Specifically, target size, target distance, number of 
possible target locations and the reward for the large target differed across the 
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experiments (see Methods for details and see Fig. 2.1 for an illustration of some of the 
differences). To state that the perceptuo-motor system is optimal (or nearly so), 
presumably implies that it can deal with a variety of situations that might occur – not 
that it is optimal for one particular target size or one reward structure only. That is, if 
the perceptuo-motor system is optimal, one would expect it to be able to cope with the 
changing conditions across Experiment 1 and 2. In the following, we report on both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 simultaneously. This facilitates comparisons between 
the two experiments, which should produce very similar results. As it turns out, 
seemingly innocuous changes in task parameters can have dramatic effects on whether 
participants are classed as optimal or sub-optimal. 
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants and Instructions 
Sixteen (8 in each experiment) members of the School’s participant panel were 
paid an hourly rate of £6 to participate and received a performance related bonus based 
on their efficiency (efficiency * £6).  
Participants were informed of the reward structure in each experiment and were 
told to maximize their total score (“earn as many points as possible”). Participants were 
told that they could receive an additional bonus of min £0 and max £6, the amount to be 
determined by their performance (“the better you do the more money you will receive”). 
All participants were naive as to the purpose of the study. All had normal, or corrected 
to normal, vision and were fully mobile. Participants were fully informed about the 
experimental protocol. 
2.2.2 Apparatus  
The experiments were written in Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.) and run with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) on a Mac Mini (Apple, Inc.). 
Participants were seated in front of a pen display (Wacom DTZ-2100, Wacom Co. Ltd.) 
slanted at 65°. The pen display was used to display stimuli and record responses. 
Responses were recorded with the spring loaded eraser end of a standard Wacom stylus 
pen. Participants chose their distance and height relative to the display so as to enable 
natural pointing movements.   
2.2.3 Stimuli, Experimental Design and Procedure 
Fig. 2.2 (Panel A, see also Fig. 2.1) illustrates the possible stimulus configurations 
in Experiment 2 (however, the actual background used was black and not white). In 
both experiments, each stimulus configuration contained a dock (radius 16 
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pixels/~4.3mm) identifying the starting position. Two discs (potential targets), one large 
(Experiment1: radius 16 pixels/~4.3 mm; Experiment 2: radius 22 pixels/~5.9 mm) and 
one small (Experiment 1: radius 8 pixels/~2.16 mm; Experiment 2: radius 11 
pixels/~2.9 mm), were displayed to the left of the dock (except for one left handed 
participant, for whom dock/targets were mirrored).  
In each trial, one disc was displayed on the 'up' axis and one was displayed on the 
'down' axis. In Experiment 1, discs were displayed at one of two distances relative to the 
dock: near (200 pixels/~5.4cm) and far (900 pixels/~24.3 cm). In Experiment 2 discs 
were displayed at one of three distances: near (170 pixels/~4.6 cm), medium (340 
pixels/~9.2 cm), or far (510 pixels/~13.8 cm). A full factorial combination of elevation, 
target location and non-target location resulted in eight unique perceptuo-motor 
stimulus configurations in Experiment 1 and 18 configurations in Experiment 2.  
Each experiment consisted of one learning session (22 trials per target size and 
location combination) and one experimental session (44 trials per unique stimulus 
configuration). In the learning session, no explicit (target) choice was made. Instead, a 
disc was designated as the target by the colour green (the non-target was red), and 
participants simply had to hit the target disc. In the experimental session both discs were 
yellow and participants chose which of the two discs they wanted to aim for.  
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Experimental procedure. Panel A: Possible stimulus configuration in 
Experiment 2. Panel B-F:  Sequence of events as a trial unfolds. The number above the 
dock (white disc) represents participants’ cumulative score. Note, stimuli are not drawn 
to scale.  
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In Experiment 1, the small target was worth 100 points, the large target was worth 
50 points, and the background was worth -25 points. In Experiment 2, the reward 
associated with the large target was raised to 75 points, a manipulation that an optimal 
participant should be unaffected by. 
Throughout the experiment, participants’ cumulative score was displayed above 
the dock in blue numerals (Panel B-F, Fig. 2.2, – exemplified here by “175” and “275”). 
Participants initiated each trial by touching the dock with the stylus (Panel B), 
whereupon one of the unique stimulus configurations was displayed. Participants were 
required to maintain contact with the dock for 750 ms ('decision time', Panel C).  A 550 
Hz tone signalled that movement should begin (Panel D). After the tone, participants 
had 550 ms to attempt to hit their chosen target (Panel E). Participants received 
feedback both on where they hit the screen and on the amount of points earned on each 
trial (Panel F). They could rest at any time during the experiment simply by not 
initiating a new trial.  
On a given trial, participants needed to respond within the 550 ms interval, but 
they were free to move as quickly as they wished within that upper bound. Responses 
that exceeded 550 ms were recorded as ‘late’. Trials in which the stylus was lifted off 
the dock before 100 ms had passed since the 'go' signal were recorded as ‘anticipatory’. 
Late and anticipatory responses resulted in feedback to speed up and slow down 
respectively and were rerun. The decision time and response time limits used match 
those of a previous study (Seydell et al., 2008).  
For each trial, reaction time, movement time, response coordinates and points 
were recorded. Reaction time was defined as the time from the go-signal to the lifting of 
the stylus pen off the dock area. Movement time was defined as the time from lifting the 
stylus off the dock area to contact with the tablet surface. Total response time was the 
sum of reaction time and movement time. Response coordinates were defined as the x 
and y position of the stylus upon first contact with the screen after the stylus had been 
lifted off the dock. 
  
2.2.4 Data analysis 
The first block in the experimental session was treated as a warm up block and 
was deleted prior to any analyses.  Late and anticipatory responses were discounted (see 
e.g., Seydell et al., 2008). For the decision session, the mean proportion of late 
responses was .07 (SD=.06). The mean proportion of anticipatory responses was .07 
(SD=.05).  
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To assess participants' overall performance, a reliable estimate of movement 
variability is needed. The free choice component of the decision session meant that 
some targets (e.g., large near targets) had few or no data points. In order to guarantee a 
minimum of 20 data points for each estimate of movement variability the last 20 trials 
(for each target size and location combination) of the learning session were combined 
with the trials from the decision phase as the basis for estimates of participant's 
precision.  
In deriving these estimates, outliers (defined as data points further than 2.5 times 
the large target radius from the target centre following Gepshtein et al., 2007) were 
excluded. The mean proportion of trials excluded as outliers in the merged data sets was 
.01 (SD=.016). 
Responses were analysed separately for each participant and each factor (target 
size and target location). As in previous studies (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 
2003b; Gepshtein et al., 2007) three assumptions were made. Firstly, it was assumed 
that the response distributions were bivariate normal, an assumption that was verified by 
inspecting chi square plots (Johnson & Wichern, 1998). Secondly, it was assumed that 
participants select a single aim point per target. In other words, it was assumed that the 
centroid of each response distribution describes the aim point for that distribution. Any 
deviation from this aim point was assumed to be due to unexplained variability 
influencing planning (Churchland, Afshar, & Shenoy, 2006) and execution (van Beers, 
Haggard & Wolpert, 2004) of movements. Finally, it was assumed that differences in 
biomechanical cost between targets were negligible (see e.g., Trommershäuser et al. 
2003a, 2003b; Gepshtein et al. 2007).   
To describe participants’ pointing behaviour we use two metrics - aim point error 
and movement variability - which we computed separately for each participant’s target 
size and target location combination. Given a normal response distribution, circular 
targets, and symmetric penalty regions (as employed here) the optimal aim point is the 
target centre. Aim point error describes the distance between participants’ aim points 
(the centroid of each response distribution) and the target centre4. The lower than aim 
point error – the closer to optimal the aim point. Movement variability was defined as 
the mean distance of the movement end points from the centroid of the response 
distribution (see e.g., Gordon, Ghilardi & Ghez, 1994).5 Movement variability describes 
                                                     
4
 Defining aim point as the [x, y] coordinate of a maximum likelihood fitted bivariate Gaussian (cf., 
Gepshtein et al., 2007) produced equivalent results. 
5
 Because movement data was anisotropic, defining movement variability as the standard deviation of the 
response distribution necessitates two dependent variables. Following Gordon et al. (1994) results in a 
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how variable participants’ pointing movements were (their perceptuo-motor variability). 
For clarity of presentation target elevation was collapsed across when computing these 
two metrics and when describing participants' use of response time.   
We present both individual plots as well as group averages for each analysis. 
Repeated measures ANOVA’s were used to test for group-level effects. When 
sphericity assumptions were violated Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used. Next, 
we report on how participants used the available response time. Thereafter we describe 
how movement variability and aim point choice relates to target distance and size. 
Following this, data describing participants’ choices between the two targets (target 
choice) is presented. Finally, participants' overall task performance is compared to that 
of an optimal agent. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Response time 
Did participants use all of the available response time as in studies with only one 
effective reach distance (Trommershäuser et al., 2003), or did they fail to maximize 
time usage as in a previous study utilizing different reach distances (Gepshtein et al., 
2007). As can be seen in Fig. 2.3, when targets were far away, participants used nearly 
all the available response time (550 ms). 6 However, for near and medium distance 
targets participants used less than the available time (effect of target distance, 
Experiment 1: F(1,7) = 85.14, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .92, Experiment 2: F(2,8) = 247.15, p  < 
.001, , ηp
2
 = .97). This suggests that participants may be satisficing rather than 
maximizing time use. If they had used the maximal amount of time available there 
would be little difference between near and far targets and the plots in Fig. 2.3 would 
look like horizontal lines.  
Another trend worth noting is that participants appear to use more of the available 
time when they reach towards small targets (dashed lines, Fig. 2.3) compared to when 
reaching to larger targets (full lines, Fig. 2.3). The difference between movement times 
for small and large targets was marginal in Experiment 1 (F(1,7) = 4.87, p = .063, ηp
2
 = 
.41) and significant in Experiment 2 (F(1,7) = 20.87, p = .003,  ηp
2
 = .75) . We did not 
detect an interaction between target size and target distance in Experiment 1 (F(2,8) = 
                                                                                                                                                           
univariate dependent measure, making analyses easier and the exposition clearer. Seydell et al. (2008) 
likewise adopted a univariate measure (the square root of the determinant of the covariance matrix) to 
describe the variability of anisotropic data. 
6
 Note that unless participants want to time out ~ 50% of the time, the mean response time has to be lower 
than the maximum response time. 
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2.17, p = .184, ηp
2
 = .24 ), but did so in Experiment 2 (F(2,8) = 5.92, p = .014, ηp
2
 = 
.46). For a detailed analysis breaking down the effects of response times into its 
separate components (reaction time and movement time) see Chapter 2 – 
Supplementary Materials. 
 
 
Fig 2.3. Response times: group averages and individual response time as a function of 
target distance, target size and experiment. The dashed line represents small targets and 
the full line represents large targets. The legend shows the radius of each target in pixels 
(1 pixel = .27 mm). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals useful for within-subject 
comparisons.   
 
2.3.2 Movement variability  
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 Fig. 2.4 Movement variability: group averages and individual movement variability as 
a function of target distance, target size and experiment. The dashed line represents 
small targets and the full line represents large targets. The legend shows the radius of 
each target in pixels (1 pixel = .27 mm). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals and 
facilitate within-subject comparisons.   
 
Movement variability appears related both to target distance and size (Fig.  2.4). 
As expected, movements to far targets were more variable than movements to near 
targets (Experiment 1: F(1,7) = 63.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .9, Experiment 2: F(1.2, 8.4) = 
40.9, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .85). Interestingly, movements were generally more variable for 
large targets (grey lines) than for small targets (dashed lines) in Experiment 2 (F(1,7) = 
15.47, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .69, size-distance interaction: F(1.1, 7.7) = .23, p = .668, ηp
2
 = 
.03). In Experiment 1, this contrast was not significant (F(1,7) = .78, p = .41, ηp
2
 = .1), 
but there was a marginal interaction between target size and distance (F(1,7) = 5.23, p = 
.056, ηp
2
 = .43). If a direct statistical comparison between near small targets and near 
large targets is made (the likely origin of the marginal interaction), it reveals that 
movements to large near targets were more variable than those to near small targets (t(7) 
= -4.14, p = .004). Thus, in Experiment 1, participants aimed with greater precision to 
small near targets than they did to large near targets.7    
                                                     
7
 There are trends in the data that suggest that for the furthest distance tested (Experiment 1, 900 pixels 
distance), the difference may disappear or even reverse (a trend that is also visible in the movement time 
plots, see Fig. S2.1). A possible explanation is that at very high difficulties participants relax their 
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 A number of movement planning theories propose that movements are planned 
so as to minimize end-point variance (Harris & Wolpert, 1998; Trommershäuser et al., 
2003a). That movements to larger targets are noisier than those to smaller targets 
suggests that the perceptuo-motor system does not always minimize end-point error but 
may instead adopt a satisficing approach (Simon, 1959). We will return to this issue and 
its wider implications below.  
   
2.3.3 Aim point error 
Aim point error is an indication of how well participants chose aim points (the 
implicit component). It describes how far participants aim points were from the target 
centre (the optimal aim point, see Methods-Data analysis). Compared to the highly 
consistent patterns for movement variability (Fig. 2.4), there appears to be little 
evidence for consistent between-subject patterns (Fig. 2.5). In other words, aim point 
choices do not seem strongly influenced by either target distance or size. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5. Aim point error: group averages and individual aim point error as a function of 
target distance, target size and experiment. The dashed line represents small targets and 
the full line represents large targets. The legend shows the radius of each target in pixels 
(1pixel = .27 mm). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
                                                                                                                                                           
precision criteria even further (e.g., “there is no point in trying hard – it’s too difficult”). An alternative 
explanation is that the far distance employed in Experiment 1 was sufficiently far, given the time 
deadline, as to constrain the possible pointing strategies that could be employed (i.e., it was not possible 
for subjects to choose different movement times for these targets). 
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In Experiment 1, there were no significant main effects of either size (F (1, 7) = 
.02, p = .9, ηp
2
 < .01) or distance (F(1,7) = 4.42, p = .074, ηp
2
 = .39), but there was a 
significant interaction between the two (F(1, 7) = 12.18, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .64). In 
Experiment 2, there was a significant effect of size (F(1,7) = 10.46, p = .014, ηp
2
 = .60), 
with aiming towards larger targets worse than aiming towards smaller targets. 
Inspecting individual data, this effect appears driven by some participants aiming more 
poorly towards nearer targets, and others aiming more poorly towards far targets, 
creating an overall effect of target size. There was no effect of distance: F(2,14) = 2.45, 
p = .12, , ηp
2
 = .25) nor was there a significant interaction (F(2,14) = .86, p = .45, ηp
2
 = 
.11). Note, however, that aim points rarely deviated from the target centre by more than 
5 pixels (1.35 mm), suggesting that participants’ aiming performance was good. 
 
2.3.4 Target choice behaviour   
To describe participants’ target choices, we compared the proportion of times the 
small target was chosen to the number of times it should have been chosen had 
participants been optimal. In Fig. 2.6, the proportion of small target choices is plotted as 
a function of the difference between the expected gain for the small and large target 
(ΔEV). If participants’ choices were optimal, participants would always choose the 
small target for positive ΔEV (a small choice proportion of 1), and always choose the 
large target for negative ΔEV (a small choice proportion of 0). Cumulative Gaussians 
have been fit to the individual data to assist the eye. If participants were optimal, these 
functions would approximate step-functions centred on the dashed line at 0 ΔEV. 
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Fig. 2.6. Target choices. Experiment 1 and 2: plots show the proportion of times the 
small target was chosen (y-axis) as a function of the difference in expected value 
between small and large targets (ΔEV, x-axis), for each participant (each panel shows 
data from one participant). Each symbol (triangles in Exp. 1, discs in Exp. 2) represents 
one unique choice situation. For positive ΔEV the small target should be chosen 
(proportion small target choices should be 1) and for negative ΔEV the large target 
should be chosen (proportion small target choices should be 0). The lines are 
cumulative Gaussian density functions to facilitate comparisons across participants and 
experiments. The slopes of the functions are a measure of participant sensitivity to 
ΔEV. The intercept, or where the function intersects a small choice proportion of .5, is 
an indication of bias. Were participants’ choices unbiased the intercept would be at or 
near ΔEV=0. Group level fits: cumulative Gaussian density functions fit to data pooled 
across participants for Experiment 1 (full grey line) and Experiment 2 (dashed black 
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line) respectively. Error bars are bootstrapped 95 percentile intervals on the intercept 
estimate.  
 
The individual data (Experiment 1 & 2, Fig. 2.6), suggest that participants are 
sensitive, but not perfectly so, to expected gain differences. Participants generally 
picked the higher valued target. However, differences between the experiments are 
apparent. In Experiment 1, many observers appear nearly un-biased. They choose small 
targets when these have higher EV’s and large targets when these have higher EV’s. In 
Experiment 2, on the other hand, most participants appear biased towards the small 
target – choosing it even if doing so results in a loss relative to choosing the larger 
target (the functions appear shifted to the left relative to 0).  
To characterise this apparent bias on a group level, we pooled the data by 
experiment and fit cumulative Gaussian density functions. As can be seen (Fig. 2.6), 
group level fits confirm the apparent trend and show that the small target bias is 
stronger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (as judged by non-overlapping 95 
percentile intervals). The relatively strong small target bias in Experiment 2 is 
noteworthy as participants appear to have aimed for the harder-to-hit target even though 
aiming for the easier-to-hit larger target would have resulted in a higher return.  
 
2.3.5 Task performance 
Task performance depended on two choices – choice of aim point and choice of 
target.  An optimal agent always picks the best target and aim point.8 As the response 
distributions were Gaussian and the penalty region symmetric (i.e., missing either target 
incurred a penalty), the optimal aim point was always the centre of each target. For each 
participant, we simulated an optimal agent performing the experiment 100 000 times. 
The resulting distribution of average gains allowed us to estimate the expected gain of 
the optimal agent and the confidence in this estimate. If a participant’s performance lay 
outside the lower 95% confidence bound they were classed as sub-optimal. If 
                                                     
8
 It has been suggested that as a result of optimizing biomechanical cost the perceptuo-motor system is 
biased towards undershooting targets (Elliott, Helsen & Chua, 2001; Elliott, Hansen, Mendoza & 
Tremblay, 2004; Lyons, Hansen, Hurding & Elliott, 2006). Sometimes, undershoot refers to the spatial 
location (primary movement end point) of the initial (more or less) ballistic phase of movements (primary 
sub-movements, e.g., Lyons et al., 2001 p. 97). Sometimes, this type of undershoot refers only to 
movements that hit the target (% of undershoot/overshoot, Elliott et al., 2004, pp., 346-347). Since our 
apparatus did not allow for reliable trajectory measurements it is impossible to say whether primary end 
points undershot targets. However, we found some evidence of end point undershooting, but participants 
did not consistently undershoot the targets consistent with previous findings (Fitts & Petersen, 1964).  
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participants performed better than this lower bound, they were classed as statistically 
indistinguishable from optimal. In other words, we used standard methods to assess 
whether participants were optimal or not (see Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 2003b for 
mathematical details). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.7. Overall task efficiency (white discs) and the lower bound of optimal efficiency 
(full line) for each participant in Experiment 1 (top panel) and 2 (bottom panel).  
 
Fig. 2.7 shows participants’ (x-axis) efficiencies for Experiment 1 (top panel) and 
Experiment 2 (bottom panel) respectively. The first thing to note is that participants’ 
efficiencies are not distributed around an efficiency of 1 – as expected if participants 
were optimal. Nevertheless, six of eight participants in Experiment 1 were within the 
bounds of optimal performance. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, only one of eight 
participants’ efficiencies was within the 95th percentile. A Fisher’s exact test comparing 
the rates of optimal performance in Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 is significant (p = 
.04) and a Bayesian comparison of rates (Kass & Raftery, 1996; Lee & Wagenmakers, 
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2005) of optimal performance shows that the hypothesis that the rates of optimal 
performance (Exp 1, 6/8; Exp 2, 1/8) differ across the two experiments is 10.7 times 
more likely than the hypothesis that the rates are the same. 
Nevertheless, the absolute efficiencies across the two experiments are fairly 
similar. That is, relative to the optimal agents, participants earned similar amounts in 
both experiments. The lower bound on optimal performance, however, appears to be 
substantially lower in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Thus, the reason participants 
are classed as optimal in Experiment 1, and not in Experiment 2, appears to be due to 
differences in the confidence intervals not due to differences in absolute efficiency 
levels. 
A Bayesian t-test comparing absolute efficiency levels across the two experiments 
shows that there is insufficient evidence to conclusively favour either the null or the 
alternative hypothesis (JZS Bayes Factor in favour of alternative hypothesis = .55, t(14) 
= -1.13, p = .28). However, the same test performed on the lower 95% confidence 
interval of optimal performance shows overwhelming support for the alternative 
hypothesis of a difference in confidence bounds (JZS Bayes Factor = 79438, t(14) = -
9.68, p < 1e-6). We return to this issue below  (“The effect of task parameters on 
performance metrics”). 
 
2.4 Discussion – Experiment 1 and 2 
Across Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the experimental set-up was identical, 
and both experiments required two kinds of choices (aim point and target choices). 
However, the precise stimulus configurations and the reward structure differed across 
experiments. Compared to Experiment 2, Experiment 1 had smaller targets, fewer target 
locations, greater target-distance differences and the difference between the rewards for 
the small and the large target was greater.  
It turns out that the differences in task parameters were highly consequential. 
Experiment 1 resulted in optimal participants, whereas Experiment 2 resulted in sub-
optimal participants. This result implies that optimality standards as commonly 
employed are not absolute but relative. Relative standards imply that classifying 
systems as optimal, or sub-optimal, without further clarification is problematic. For 
which experiment should we use if we wanted to evaluate the optimality of the 
perceptuo-motor system: Experiment 1 or Experiment 2? We explore the effects task 
parameters have on the two sub-components of our task in greater detail below and 
return to this point in the General Discussion.   
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Regardless of whether participants were classed as sub-optimal or optimal, they 
were generally sensitive to the difference in expected gain between small and large 
targets. They generally choose the higher valued target more often than the lower valued 
target. On the other hand, participants in Experiment 2 were biased towards choosing 
the small target, representing the higher but more uncertain gain, even when this choice 
on average produced lower gains than choosing the lower valued but relatively certain 
gain.      
Both experiments further suggest that participants’ perceptuo-motor behaviour 
may deviate from optimality in ways not captured by Trommershäuser et al.’s (2003a, 
2003b) model. Firstly, participants appeared to favour speed over precision, producing 
movements to near targets that were faster than necessary. Given the speed-accuracy 
trade off (Fitts, 1954; Schmidt, et al. 1979), such movements should decrease precision 
and therefore participants’ ability to hit targets. The model fails to capture such apparent 
satisficing as it assumes that people move as to maximize precision. Secondly, 
participants appear to relax their precision criteria when aiming for larger targets. As 
Trommershäuser et al.’s model assumes that precision is maximized the model does not 
penalize participants for this. If participants do not always minimize movement error in 
perceptuo-motor tasks, an optimal model assuming that they do may make them appear 
more optimal than they actually are.  
 
2.5 The effect of task parameters on performance metrics 
The key result of Experiment 1 and 2 was that seemingly innocuous changes in 
task parameters, such as target size, can result in very different views on optimality. 
Next we simulate the effects of changes in task parameters, separately for the implicit 
and the explicit choice component, to explore in greater detail how such changes might 
affect participants who deviate from optimality.  
 
2.5.1 Task parameters and the optimality of aim point choices 
Fig. 2.8 illustrates the effect of changing target size on the implicit choice 
component. Panel A shows the optimal aim point (cross) with sample hit points (grey 
discs) as well as two sub-optimal aim points (triangle and square). As target size 
increases, naturally so does the likelihood of hitting the target (Panel B), whether you 
are optimal (full line) or sub-optimal (triangles & squares). Panel C shows the hit 
probability for the two sub-optimal aim points as proportion of the optimal hit 
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probability (i.e., as efficiency). It appears that sub-optimal aiming becomes less costly 
in terms of absolute efficiency as target size increases.  
 
 
Fig 2.8. Effects of changing task parameters on implicit choice. A) Target and optimal 
and sub-optimal aim points (with a hypothetical response distribution [grey discs]). B) 
Hit probabilities for each of the three aim points: optimal (full line), small deviation 
(triangles), and a large deviation (squares). C) Efficiencies (hit probabilities normalized 
by optimal hit probabilities) for the two sub-optimal aim points in Panel A and B. D) As 
Panel C) but now with the lower 95% CI of optimal performance.  
 
However, as noted in the description of Trommershäuser et al.’s paradigm, 
whether or not behaviour is considered optimal depends not on absolute efficiency, but 
the relationship between absolute efficiency and the variability of the optimal agent. 
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Panel D) shows the lower 95% confidence bound on the optimal agent’s hit efficiency 
(dashed line). When either of the two sub-optimal aim points (triangles, squares) results 
in efficiencies above the dashed line, participants would be classed as optimal. 
Conversely, efficiencies lower than the dashed line implies that participants are sub-
optimal. As can be seen (Panel D), smaller targets result in more variable optimal agents 
(wider CI’s). This means that small targets allow for greater deviation from the optimal 
aim point before participants are classed as sub-optimal.  
How do these simulations fit with the results of Experiment 1 and 2? Targets in 
Experiment 1 were smaller than targets in Experiment 2. This means that sub-optimal 
participants should have been more likely to be classed as optimal in Experiment 1. This 
is precisely the pattern of results obtained. There were significantly more optimal 
participants in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2, and this difference appeared driven 
by differences in confidence intervals rather than differences in absolute efficiencies. 
We return to the issue of the confidence interval difference between Experiment 1 and 2 
below, and show that changes in target size is likely to have accounted only for a small 
part of the total effect.  
 
2.5.2 Task parameters and the optimality of target choices 
Fig. 2.9 illustrates the effect of changing hit probabilities for the other component 
of the task: target choice (the explicit component). Fixing the large target’s distance and 
size, we increase the size of the smaller target. The simulated large target is sufficiently 
large so to achieve a hit probability of near 1. Panel A illustrates the effect of this 
manipulation on hit probabilities for the small target (dashed line) relative to the large 
target (full line). As we increase the small target’s size (increase target size ratio), it 
becomes increasingly easy to hit (hit probability increases). 
 Of course, for choosing between the small (dashed line) and the large target (full 
line), knowing hit probabilities is not sufficient; we need to know the rewards 
associated with each target. Panel B shows the number of points we can expect to earn 
for the respective target for the reward structure employed in Experiment 1. For a small 
to large target size ratio of up to ~.4, the large target should be chosen (its expected 
value is higher). With further increases in the small target size, one should switch and 
choose the small target. ΔEV is the difference in expected value between the small and 
large target. If it is positive, the smaller target is worth more and should be chosen (if 
negative the large target is worth more).  
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Fig 2.9. Effects of changing task parameters on explicit choice. A) The effect of the 
target size ratio on hit probability for the small (dashed line) and large (full line) 
respectively. B) Expected value of the small (dashed line) and large (full line) target as a 
function of target size ratio. ΔEV is the difference in expected value between the small 
and the large target (see text for explanation). The cross represents a hypothetical choice 
situation in which the small target should be chosen. C) Choice predictions (as 
proportion small target choices) for an optimal agent (black step-function) and a less-
than-perfectly sensitive sub-optimal agent (grey function).  
 
The black step-function in Panel C (Fig. 2.9) illustrates the behaviour of an 
optimal participant who maximizes expected value (as in Trommershäuser et al.’s 
2003a, 2003b model) and its shape is illustrative of the all-or-none prediction of 
maximization theories in general (e.g., expected utility theory). As can be seen, if the 
small target is worth more (positive ΔEV) it is always chosen (the proportion of small 
target choices is 1), and conversely when the large target is worth more (negative ΔEV) 
it is always chosen.  
Although the black line illustrates normative responses, which are perfectly 
sensitive to ΔEV, people are unlikely to exhibit such sensitivity. Consequently, one 
might expect better choices when ΔEV is large (because it should be more readily 
apparent which of the two targets is better, see e.g., Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; see 
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2008 for this idea applied to model evaluation).  
The grey function in Panel C illustrates a participant who is less-than-perfectly 
sensitive to differences in expected value (ΔEV). The cross in Panel B and C, illustrates 
a particular choice situation, in which the optimal response is to choose the small target. 
A partially sensitive participant (grey line) will only pick the optimal target ~80% of the 
time – leading to a loss relative to the ideal agent (black line). From the grey function, it 
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should also be clear that as the absolute ΔEV becomes larger, the optimal agent and the 
sub-optimal agent become increasingly similar. 
How does the above relate to the explicit choices in Experiment 1 and 2? In 
Experiment 1 the difference between the small and large target reward was greater and 
the target-distance differences were greater than those in Experiment 2. This should 
have made expected value differences in Experiment 1 larger. The mean absolute 
expected value difference was indeed greater in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 
(t(13) = 2.74, p = .017, mean difference = 4.23, one outlier ~2.5 inter-quartile ranges 
from the median in Experiment 2 excluded). Thus, for someone who is only partially 
sensitive to ΔEV differences, Experiment 1 should be easier than Experiment 2. One 
indication that this was the case is the fact that biases were less severe in Experiment 1 
(see Fig. 2.6).  
 
2.5.3 Task parameters and bounds of optimal performance for whole experiments 
The confidence interval on the optimal agents’ performance is crucial. It is used to 
infer whether or not participants are optimal. Indeed, across Experiment 1 and 2, 
participants’ absolute efficiencies were approximately equal. Yet, participants in 
Experiment 1 were classed as optimal, and those in Experiment 2 were classed as sub-
optimal. Experiment 2 resulted in a more lenient standard of optimality as the 
confidence intervals of optimal agents’ earnings were wider.  
What accounts for the wider confidence intervals in Experiment 2? As outlined 
above, target size and the reward for the large target differed across experiments. A 
third factor is sample size. Increasing the number of unique choice options as was done 
here (Experiment 1 = 8, Experiment 2 = 18), whilst keeping the number of choices for 
each choice option constant, results in a different number of total trials. The total 
number of trials was substantially greater in Experiment 2 (42*18=756) than in 
Experiment 1 (42*8=336). Everything else being equal, a greater sample size leads to 
tighter confidence intervals. Thus, the difference in confidence intervals could 
potentially be accounted for by changes in target size, changes in rewards and/or 
changes in total sample size. 
We explored the effect of these three factors by simulation. We simulated the 
ideal agents of Experiment 2 (tight confidence intervals) under conditions which were 
made increasingly similar to those of Experiment 1. To make the two maximally 
comparable, we selected the target locations in Experiment 2 that were most similar to 
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those in Experiment 1 (near and far). This also has the beneficial effect of equating the 
total number of trials for the simulated experiments to that of Experiment 1. 
Fig. 2.10 shows the tight confidence interval reported for Experiment 2 (grey 
discs, ‘Exp 2’, identical to Fig. 2.7, bottom panel). The other symbols illustrate the 
effects of different reward and target size combinations when the number of target 
locations is equal (‘N’) to that in Experiment 1. For example, ‘Exp 1: N & size’, means 
that the total number of trials and the target size were the same as in Experiment 1. The 
shaded region represents the 95% confidence bound on the average lower bound on 
efficiency reported for Experiment 1 (Fig. 2.7, top panel). If Experiment 1 and 2 were 
identical, one would expect the average confidence interval for Experiment 2 to lie in 
this shaded region.  
 
Fig. 2.10. The lower confidence bound of optimal efficiency as a function of sample 
size, target size and reward structure. The five different symbols represent the lower 
2.5% bound of optimal performance as Experiment 2 is made increasingly similar to 
Experiment 1. The shaded area between the dashed lines represents the 95% confidence 
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bound (bootstrapped) on the average lower 2.5% bound of optimal performance in 
Experiment 1. 
 
The difference between the original fit (grey discs, ‘Exp 2’) and the other fits is a 
measure of the effect size of a particular change. For example, it is apparent that 
changing only the number of trials (compare the ‘Exp 2’ to crosses, ‘Exp 1: N’), has a 
relatively small effect. Likewise changing the number of total trials and size (stars, ‘Exp 
1: N & size’) has a relative minor effect. Making the difference in small and large 
rewards larger (triangles, ‘Exp 1: N & reward’), as in Experiment 1, or changing both 
the rewards and the target sizes (squares, ‘Exp 1: N, size & reward’), has substantially 
greater impact.  
In fact, once the agents of Experiment 2 experience similar conditions to those of 
Experiment 1 (squares, ‘Exp 1: N, size & reward’), 5 of 8 simulated bounds lie within 
the confidence interval of the average actual bound of Experiment 1. The slight 
underestimation of variability relative to Experiment 1 (shaded area) is likely due to the 
fact that far targets were nearer in Experiment 2 (this difference could not be simulated). 
Because targets were nearer, they also were easier to hit (a greater proportion had hit 
probabilities close to 1, and fewer close to .5), and therefore resulted in less variable 
gains, which lead to tighter confidence intervals.  
It is perhaps surprising that the effect of doubling the number of trials has such a 
relatively minor effect on the width of the confidence intervals. However, for an entire 
experiment, what matters is the variability on the gain achieved in the whole 
experiment. This variability depends not only on the confidence intervals for hit-
probabilities of particular targets (as illustrated in Fig. 2.8), but also on the specific 
combinations of rewards, penalties and hit probabilities across targets (as shown in Fig. 
2.10). 
 To illustrate, consider a task in which an optimal participant attempts to hit two 
different targets. In one experiment, the rewards for hitting the targets are 259 and 10. In 
another experiment the rewards for the targets are 115 and 100. In both experiments the 
penalty for missing is -5, and the higher valued target is harder to hit than the lower 
valued target (hit probability of .5 vs. .8).  
An optimal participant is expected to earn the same number of points in both 
experiments (134). However, the confidence interval on the expected gain will be very 
different. In fact, the former scenario (259 vs. 10) will result in confidence intervals 
almost twice the width (~77 vs. ~ 44) of the latter scenario (115 vs. 100). This example 
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illustrates that although one can, as was shown above, illustrate some of the potential 
problems of categorizing participants as optimal and sub-optimal by breaking down the 
effects of particular changes in task parameters; the final verdict on whether people are 
optimal or not, depends on task parameters that interact in ways not easily captured by 
such modelling.  
 
2.6 General discussion 
2.6.1 Summary of empirical results 
It has been suggested that the perceptuo-motor system makes optimal decisions in 
tasks that require both explicit target choice and implicit aim point choice 
(Trommershäuser et al., 2006; Seydell et al., 2008). Using a novel perceptuo-motor 
decision task, we found that this was the case for one particular set of task parameters 
(Experiment 1), but not for another particular set of task parameters (Experiment 2). 
Even in Experiment 1, where participants were mostly optimal, participants’ efficiencies 
were consistently lower than lower than 1. That is, efficiencies did not cluster around 1 
as expected if participants had been optimal.  
We argued that the likely origin of the difference between Experiment 1 and 2 
was a more lax criterion (wider confidence intervals) of optimality in Experiment 1. The 
more lenient criterion appeared to have been caused by seemingly innocuous changes in 
task parameters, such as changes in target size and target rewards - changes which do 
not affect the expected performance of an optimal agent – yet had dramatic effects on 
whether or not participants were classed as optimal. Through explorations of the 
optimal model we showed that changes in parameters across Experiment 1 and 2 were 
such that Experiment 1 is likely to be easier for (sub-optimal) participants than 
Experiment 2. 
 
2.6.2 Apparent relaxation of precision criteria when aiming for large targets 
In addition to task-parameter dependent optimality, our results suggest that people 
are sub-optimal in ways not captured by the implemented model (Trommershäuser et 
al., 2003ab). Participants reached with greater precision to small targets than to large 
targets, which suggests that humans sometimes satisifice rather than maximize 
precision. In a small control study (see Supplementary Materials: Chapter 2 for details), 
we tested whether participants could reach with equal precision to small and large 
targets when they were explicitly asked to do so. Under these conditions, three of five 
tested participants reached with equal precision to small and large targets. Given this 
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data, the null hypothesis of equal precision was more than three times as likely as the 
alternative hypothesis that the precision was unequal (JZS Bayes Factors > 3), with the 
evidence for the two other participants being inconclusive. Consequently, the failure to 
reach to small and large targets with equal precision in Experiment 1 and 2 does not 
appear to be due to a capacity limitation. One can also show that the apparent precision-
satisficing in Experiment 1 and 2 was consequential by simulating optimal agents who 
aim with equal precision to both target sizes. Had participants been compared to such 
agents, their efficiencies would have dropped significantly relative to the standard 
analyses presented above (t(17) = t(15) = -3.74, p = .002, mean difference = -.02).  
Given that ours appears to be the only perceptuo-motor decision-making 
experiment to have looked for target-size effects, the implications of the apparent 
precision satisficing remains unclear. The problem participants faced in our task is 
different to that in most previous studies9. This may mean that the precision-satisficing 
finding is of limited applicability to earlier studies (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 
2003b). Nevertheless, in the absence of independent assessment of the precision 
maximization assumption, it is at least possible that it also applies to earlier studies.  
 
2.6.3 Apparent under-utilisation of response time 
 Participants evidenced another type of apparent sub-optimality not captured in 
Trommershäuser et al.’s (2003a, 2003b) model. As Gepshtein et al. (2007), we found 
that participants did not make use of all the available response time when pointing to 
near targets. Can this under-utilisation be explained by reference to movement duration 
minimisation? Tanaka, Krakauer and Qian (2006) have proposed that the motor-system 
minimizes movement duration whilst keeping movement variability below a criterion 
determined by the task at hand. For example, putting a key in a lock seemingly requires 
a high precision, whereas picking up a sock off the floor does not. If precision need not 
be maximized, the latter task allows faster movements. Their model could potentially 
explain both the failure to maximize precision and the failure to maximize response 
time.  
                                                     
9
 In our task, the control problem is essentially three-dimensional, whereas Trommershäuser et al.’s task 
is essentially two-dimensional. Pointing movements in their tasks are away from the body towards a 
screen facing the participant. This implies that controlling variance in the depth plane is relatively 
unimportant (providing the trajectory is relatively perpendicular to the screen as the finger approaches it) 
as movements are stopped by the screen. Our tasks involved pointing along a, in the depth plane, curved 
trajectory (from a right-side dock, towards the body, away from the body, to a left-side target). This 
meant that although the targets were 2D (as in Trommershäuser et al.’s studies) – variance in the depth 
plane mattered (poor depth control should result in over or undershooting). 
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However, it appears that at least some participants traded-off reaction time and 
movement time. These participants initiated reaches to harder-to-hit targets (e.g., far 
targets) faster than they initiated reaches to easier-to-hit targets (see see Supplementary 
Materials: Chapter 2 for details for data suggestive of this). This is interesting as it 
suggests that although response time usage is not maximized, the perceptuo-motor 
system is somewhat compensating for the extra movement time needed for targets that 
are hard to hit (but there were signs that the reaction times to smaller targets were 
actually slower than to larger targets – questioning the generality of this point).  
Our results suggest that neither reaction time nor movement time is minimized. If 
the system was designed to move as fast as possible given a set criterion (cf., Tanaka et 
al.), it would presumably initiate movements as fast as possible as this would allow for 
faster motor action (all other things being equal). The fact that reaction time was 
modulated by target distance means that it does not do this. Instead, trading off 
movement time with reaction time, and satisficing precision, may be a result of 
optimizing a more complex function (perhaps one that can be adjusted on the basis of 
task demands as suggested by Todorov and Jordan’s [2002] optimal feedback control 
theory).  
 
2.7 Theoretical implications 
The main implication of these experiments, as we will argue, is that the standard 
method of analysis (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a, 2003b; Wu et al., 2006) where 
participant’s performance is compared to an optimal agent, based on characteristics of 
that participant’s performance, does not necessarily result in an absolute performance 
standard. Consequently, such analyses do not seem to support conclusions about 
optimality “in general”. Instead, statements about optimality are specific and 
conditional: behaviour is optimal given a task of this difficulty, and given these capacity 
constraints included in the optimal agent. In this case, however, it is unclear how such 
analyses could support comparisons across tasks (whether within or between cognitive 
domains). In other words, it may not be appropriate to use this method to make 
unconditional inferences about the optimality of behaviour.  
 
2.7.1 The Problem of Task Difficulty 
We have shown that it is possible to make people appear optimal, or sub-optimal, 
by seemingly innocuous changes in task parameters. Thus, it seems that models such as 
the one used here are sensitive to task difficulty. When a task is “easy” performance is 
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good, when a task is “hard” performance is bad. If one wants to make claims such as 
“system X is optimal” this is unfortunate. It would seem a desirable property (of optimal 
models) that the classification of a studied system does not change as a function of 
minor task changes. Secondly, even if this were to be viewed as a non-problem – the 
problem of specifying a “standard” task against which performance confidently can be 
assessed remains. Which target size, for example, represents a suitable difficulty level 
when assessing aim point choice efficiency? Unless task difficulty can be defined 
independently of tasks, comparing performance within, or between, modalities seems 
difficult. Naturally, if whatever makes the task harder for participants were to be 
correctly modelled, performance would no longer be a function of task difficulty, but, of 
course,  this does not make the ideal standard absolute. Instead, it highlights the 
conditional nature of such models. 
 
2.7.2 On the use of optimal agents to infer unconditional optimality. 
At first glance, quantitative ideal observer methods might seem suited to take into 
account task difficulty. In fact, ideal observer methods have been promoted on the 
grounds that they provide an absolute standard (e.g., Shimozaki, Kingstone, Olk, Stowe 
& Eckstein, 2006). Note, however, that this standard is critically dependent on the 
constraints imposed on the ideal agent. An ideal agent, whose constraints exactly match 
those of the participant, is likely to match the participant’s performance exactly. 
Likewise, an ideal agent who incorporates none of the constraints is likely to be vastly 
superior to the modelled system. Performance is not absolute, but relative to the 
constraints built into the model. Importantly, if built-in assumptions are unjustified, they 
may cause overestimation, or underestimation, of performance independently of task 
difficulty. 
This is in no way to say that ideal observer analysis is flawed as a method. Ideal 
observer analysis is an extremely useful analytical tool, as evidenced by the arguably 
tremendous success it has had. It can, for example, be used to chart the efficiency of a 
system (e.g., Barlow, 1962) or it can be used to constrain the search for plausible 
models (Schrater & Kersten, 2002).  
 
2.7.3 General implications for inferences about the optimality of behaviour 
The above points arguably apply with equal force to the cognitive domain. One 
may argue that because one can show fundamental deviations from normative standards 
under simple experimental conditions (e.g., choices between two options), the problem 
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of task difficulty does not arise. To drive the point home, one may further argue that 
many real world problems are orders of magnitude more complex. However, this 
argument fails to recognize that many of the experimental problems in this literature 
differ very little in terms of expected outcome. If experiments, in addition, have low 
ecological validity they may not tap processes that are most likely to have been 
optimized (either through learning or evolution). 
To illustrate, consider a choice pattern that violates maximization of expected 
value10. When asked to choose between a gamble that yields $2500 with a .33 
probability, $2400 with a .66 probability and $0 with a .01 probability and a gamble that 
yields $2400 with certainty, most tend to pick the latter (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
pp. 265–266). The expected value of the former is $2409 and the expected value of the 
latter is $2400. Note that the expected loss of choosing the modal response is only 
0.4%. Presumably, people would not select the lottery with the lower expected value if 
the difference were much larger. Furthermore, assuming noisy computational processes 
(Faisal, Selen & Wolpert, 2008), people might not even be able to distinguish between 
expected values that differ very little. Thus, it may be argued, that the decision is a hard 
one.  
In general, any decision problem could be made difficult enough to be 
unresolvable by an actual physical system. Trivially, for example, differences in 
expected utility might be made so slight (for example, present in decimal places only) as 
to exceed the resolution of the system. Typically, however, such limitations will not be 
perceived as interesting. Rather, limitations are of note typically only where we have 
reason to believe that the system could, or should, be able to deal with the problem at 
hand. This is typically not articulated explicitly, but permeates all research on human 
rationality. Experimental demonstrations of norm violations such as base rate neglect, 
the conjunction fallacy, framing effects, or logical reasoning errors generate widespread 
interest because they are perceived as ‘gross’ errors.  Subsequent research then typically 
seeks to at least partially restore the case for human rationality by demonstrating that 
unnatural or misleading problem formulations are to blame for poor performance, or 
that the error in question, ‘in the real-world’, is ultimately not a costly one (e.g., Hilton, 
1995). In other words, subsequent research challenges the perception that participants 
should readily be able to avoid these errors.  
                                                     
10
 This exposition relies on expected value, the original problem deals with expected utility. However, as 
the perceptuo-motor decision-making literature has relied on expected value (gain) and not utility, 
expected value is used as an example here.  
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Both demonstrations of rationality and of irrationality, it seems, are inherently set 
against background expectations that make the observation interesting, whether as a 
surprising failure, where success seems reasonable, or as striking performance where a 
task seems difficult. It would seem that there are no absolute standards of rationality in 
practice. This is in no way to say that research on the rationality or optimality of human 
performance is not informative. However, the limitations of the kinds of statements that 
are being made must be considered.  
 
2.8 Summary 
We have argued that statements to the optimality of a given system can be made 
only conditionally (at least when standard analyses are used). Specifically, task 
difficulty and modelled constraints influence the classification of a system as optimal or 
sub-optimal. In order to make performance comparisons within or between systems, one 
needs an absolute standard of performance. Alternatively, one can try to equate task 
difficulty and modelled constraints across tasks as far as possible. The latter solution 
solves the problem of conditional optimality by attempting to equate the conditionality 
of task performance. Whilst this does not seem to allow unconditional statements such 
as “system X is optimal”; it does allow comparisons across modalities to the extent that 
they can be presented with “the same” problem. Wu et al. (2009) represents an 
interesting example of this latter approach. Interestingly, they found little evidence for 
previously made comparative claims favouring the performance of perceptuo-motor 
decision-making over higher-level cognitive decision-making11. 
In conclusion, presently, there seems to be little basis for the claim that human 
perceptuo-motor decision-making is optimal and that human cognitive decision-making 
is not.  
  
                                                     
11
 Wu et al. (2009) conducted two experiments. In the first they found no evidence that the degree to 
which the independence axiom is violated differs between perceptuo-motor choices and classical paper-
and-pencil type decisions. In a second experiment they found that, for a particular parameterization of 
cumulative prospect theory, the probability weighting function parameters differed between the two types 
of decisions. Whilst this is interesting in of itself, the mere fact that probabilities need to be weighted in 
the first instance means that decisions were sub-optimal (albeit in different ways). See Wu et al., 2009 for 
details.  
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3. Interlude 1 
In the previous chapter, we showed that one can make the perceptuo-motor 
system appear optimal, or sub-optimal, by making seemingly innocuous changes to a 
perceptuo-motor decision-making task. For example, by making the possible distance 
differences between targets larger, we increased the difference in expected value 
between pairs of targets. This change does not affect the performance of an agent who 
behaves according to the optimal model of Trommershäuser et al. (2003a, 2003b). 
However, as we argued, one might expect this change to affect human participants. The 
result that human performance seemingly was affected by such changes, yet the model 
not, suggests that Trommershäuser et al.’s optimal model may need extending to fully 
capture human behaviour.   
Some changes across tasks did, however, affect the behaviour of the optimal 
agent. Importantly, these changes caused the earnings of the optimal agent to become 
more variable. The standard method of assessing performance is to compare 
participants’ actual performance to the distribution of the optimal agent’s earnings (see 
e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a Wu et al., 2006). If participants’ earnings lie outside 
the lower 2.5 percentile of this distribution they are classed as sub-optimal. Therefore, if 
one can manipulate the standard deviation of that distribution, without otherwise 
affecting participants’ absolute efficiency (i.e., their earnings relative to the expected 
earnings of the optimal agent), it should be possible to make people look either optimal 
or sub-optimal, despite the fact that their actual performance relative to the ideal 
observer has not changed. The widening of the confidence interval in Experiment 2, 
relative to Experiment 1, without a noticeable difference in absolute efficiency levels 
for our participants, suggests that we succeeded in doing just that.  
These results were worrying to us. The fact that one can change the classification 
of the perceptuo-motor system from optimal to sub-optimal, by making such small and 
apparently harmless changes to tasks, implied difficulties for the assessment of the 
perception-cognition gap. For how can one justifiably compare performance across 
perceptual and cognitive tasks, if the standard of optimal performance is relative, not 
absolute - even within a single domain? 
The next chapter represents an attempt at getting around the problem of relative 
performance standards. The central idea was to use a decision task that might be viewed 
as modality independent. One such task is making decisions about how much time to 
spend. To decide how much time to spend on a given task wisely, you need to know 
how costly it is to get the task wrong, how rewarding it is to get it right, and how your 
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task performance changes as a function of how much time you spend on the task.  
Importantly, deciding how much time to spend on a given task is a decision problem 
that arises both for tasks that are primarily perceptual and for tasks that are primarily 
cognitive.  
In the next series of experiments we used decisions about time to first explore 
perceptual performance in some detail. We then contrasted perceptual and cognitive 
performance. That is, we compared the two in a situation in which the decision task 
itself (time decisions) and the reward information (points converted to money) was 
identical across “cognition” and “perception”. What identified the tasks as either 
perceptual or cognitive was how the underlying knowledge required to perform the 
decisions was derived (from cognitive or perceptual experience). In other words, the 
probabilities (here in the form of accuracies) came from either the perceptual or the 
cognitive domain, but the value information was identical across domains as was the 
type of decision. The following experiments might therefore be viewed as a test of 
whether the format in which uncertainty information is presented affects decision 
performance. 
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4. Knowing When to Move On: Cognitive and Perceptual Decisions 
in Time
12
 
A hunter-gatherer is tracking prey through a forest. In his path lies a pond. Does 
he think that it would take him longer to pass it by going to the left or to the right? The 
time it would take him to answer that question with certainty is likely longer than the 
time lost by making the wrong choice. Thus, he deliberates only briefly before going 
left. Then, coming upon dense undergrowth he sees movement. It is an area known for 
dangerous predators. So, before proceeding, he spends a considerable time making sure 
that he knows what caused the movement. These decisions are about how much time to 
spend on the task at hand. Good performance depends on, among other things, taking 
the cost of errors into account and having knowledge of one’s own task performance.  
Given that decisions are an integral part of life, it seems plausible that humans 
have acquired, through a combination of learning and evolution, excellent decision 
making skills. In line with this idea, human perceptuo-motor and perceptual decisions 
do often appear near-optimal (Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2003a, 2003b; 
Whitely & Sahani, 2008; Navalpakkam, Koch & Perona, 2009; Navalpakkam, Koch 
Rangel, Perona, 2010).  
We tested whether people also can be near-optimal when they make decisions like 
those faced by the hunter-gatherer in the scenario above. First we explored people’s 
ability to make timing decisions when the underlying task is perceptual. That is, when 
the crucial knowledge, of how performance changes as a function of time, is derived 
from perceptual experience. We found that performance was very good. Remarkably, 
our participants achieved this level of performance in the absence of any feedback.  
Although perceptual and perceptuo-motor decisions often appear near optimal, 
extensive research exemplified by the work of Kahneman and Tversky
 
(Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003), suggests that human higher-level decision making is 
far from optimal. The apparent performance dissociation between high- and low-level 
decisions has not gone unnoticed (Trommershäuser, Landy & Maloney, 2006; 
Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2008). 
Intrigued by this perception-cognition gap, we wondered whether it might apply 
to timing decisions. Specifically, performance might be affected by the “modality” of 
the underlying task. Decisions for which the required knowledge is derived through 
perceptual experience might be better than those for which the knowledge is derived 
                                                     
12
 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in Psychological Science. 
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from cognitive experience. We were not able to confirm such a difference. In fact, 
timing decisions were near-optimal whether the underlying task was of a perceptual or 
more cognitive nature. The highly similar performance suggests that knowledge can be 
acquired, and used for timing decisions, in an equally proficient way whether it is 
derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.  
 
4.1 Experimental paradigm 
 Our experiments involved two stages. The purpose of the first stage was to 
estimate how accuracy changes as a function of time spent on the given task. The tasks 
we employed were like the initial ‘shortest path around the pond’ example. There were 
two possible outcomes: success or failure in picking the right answer.  If only a very 
brief moment is spent on such a task, performance will be very poor (accuracy ~ .5). As 
the time spent on the task increases, so should performance - until performance reaches 
a plateau where further increases in time do not yield improvements (e.g., when 
accuracy = 1). We assessed participants’ accuracy for six different task durations (Fig. 
4.1A, dots). The time available was constrained by forced deadlines (Schouten & 
Bekker, 1967). A first tone was presented at stimuli onset, another tone was presented 
half way to the deadline, and a final tone was presented at deadline. By manipulating 
deadlines we were able to sample times that resulted in a range of accuracies (from 
~50% correct to asymptote). We used this data to estimate the relationship between time 
and accuracy by fitting a function (Weibull, 1951, Fig. 4.1A, line, see “SI Methods: 
Fitting the Weibull function to accuracy data” for details). This function describes the 
time-accuracy relationship well (see “SI Methods: Assessing goodness of fit”). 
In the decision making stage, participants were given an overall time interval 
within which to complete as many individual trials of the task as they saw fit (Fig. 4.1B, 
top). Participants were told the values of correct and incorrect responses in points, were 
paid a performance related bonus and were instructed to earn as many points as 
possible. To maximize their earnings they had to choose, among the many possible 
average response times, the one that maximizes reward (Fig. 4.1B, bottom, see “SI 
Methods: Mathematical formulation of the decision problem” for a formal description). 
To ensure that we were studying on-line decisions (rather than, for example, learning of 
decision criteria or stimulus-response contingencies) no feedback was provided.
13
  
                                                     
13
 The absence of feedback here is worth stressing, because the many studies of timing decisions (Bogacz, 
2007), largely focussed on testing specific models (Grice, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978) and not the optimality of 
timing decisions in general (but see
 
Bogacz, Hu, Holmes & Cohen, 2010), have involved extensive 
feedback (as have perceptuo-motor studies with time-based cost functions, see Trommershäuser et al., 
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Fig. 4.1. Experimental paradigm. (A) Data from the assessment stage fit with a Weibull 
function. (B) Decision making stage (top), choice of average response time (bottom). 
(C) An efficiency function with two hypothetical timing choices.  
 
To evaluate participants’ choices we mapped average response times onto 
efficiency functions (Fig. 4.1C). An efficiency function describes how well one would 
be doing (on average) for a given response time.  An efficiency of 1 means that one is 
earning as many points as one possibly could (and money, as bonus pay was 
proportional to efficiency). Responding at a faster, or slower, time than optimal, will 
result in a lower efficiency (and less money earned).  
Efficiency functions were derived by taking into account a participant’s time-
accuracy function (Fig. 4.1A) and the rewards/penalties along with the refractory period 
between decisions. By mapping response times onto independently assessed efficiency 
functions (see “SI Methods: Extrapolation from Weibull fits to choice data” for 
validation) decision making performance can be assessed across a range of underlying 
tasks. Our approach of mapping response times onto empirically assessed functions is 
essentially model-free. 
 
4.2 Timing decisions based on perceptual information 
A basic question is whether people’s choices relate to the efficiency functions in 
any meaningful way. We therefore began with a systematic exploration of decision 
                                                                                                                                                           
2008 for an overview). Feedback is known to alter patterns of decision (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; 
Camilleri & Newell, 2011) and has been found to improve performance in the supposedly weaker 
‘cognitive’ domain (see e.g., Chu & Chu, 1990; Shanks, Tunney & McCarthy 2002; Jessup, Bishara & 
Busemeyer, 2008).  Hence authors reporting optimality in the perceptual domain have sought to rule out 
learning from the extensive feedback provided as an explanation (e.g., Trommershäuser, et al, 2003a; 
Whitely & Sahani, 2008, but see e.g., Navalpakkam et al., 2009), setting these studies apart from decision 
from experience studies that have evaluated the effect of perceptual uncertainty on decisions but not 
sought to rule out learning-based explanations (Shafir, Reich, Tsur, Erev & Lotem, 2008). 
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making performance in the context of a low-level visual task - motion discrimination 
(e.g., Shadlen & Newsome, 2001, see “SI Methods: Additional details”). In this task, 
many dots move in random directions across a screen. A proportion of these dots, 
however, move coherently in one of two possible directions. The task is to judge the 
direction of the coherently moving dots. Intuitively, this task might be likened to the 
task of judging the direction of the wind by looking at how raindrops fall.  
Using this task we manipulated two of the factors that influence the shape of 
efficiency functions: task difficulty and relative rewards. If people’s behaviour is well 
described by the optimal model, one would expect them to be sensitive to such 
manipulations. For example, if a particular manipulation shifts the peak to the right 
(slower response required), one would expect people to also shift to the right (slow 
down). Importantly, if people’s behaviour is well described by the optimal model, one 
would expect people’s timing choices to be near the optimal ones. 
 
4.2.1 Experiment 1: Motion discrimination & task difficulty 
A change in task difficulty will produce a change in the accuracy function 
(easy=full line, hard=dashed line, Fig. 4.2A), which in turn influences the shape of the 
efficiency function (Fig. 4.2B). An increase in task difficulty generally shifts the peak 
of the efficiency function to the right, so that a slower response time is required (Fig. 
4.2B). Using a neutral reward structure (reward = 1, penalty = -1), we manipulated task 
difficulty by changing the proportion of coherently moving dots (“easy” = 70%, “hard” 
= 20%). Are people sensitive to changes in task difficulty, and if so do they choose 
response times that coincide with the peak of the efficiency functions?  
4.2.1.1 Methods. Six members of the School of Psychology’s participant panel 
took part in one learning session (30 min) and two experimental sessions (30 min each) 
in exchange for £6/hr and an additional performance related bonus (average achieved 
efficiency * £6). In the learning session participants learned what buttons to press by 
doing the motion discrimination task with no time limit, no rewards or penalties, and 
auditory cues for correct and incorrect responses. They also performed the assessment 
stage of the experimental session in order to practise the timing requirements.  
The experimental session involved two stages: assessment and decision making. 
The assessment stage (see “Experimental paradigm” above) involved the assessment of 
task accuracy as a function of time spent on the task (with deadlines manipulated across 
blocks of trials). The decision-making stage involved 2 two minute periods (spread 
across two sessions) for each task difficulty. Participants were informed that they would 
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earn 1 point for each correct response, -1 point for each incorrect response, that the goal 
was to earn as many points as possible and that the more points they earned the more 
extra money they would receive. Importantly, there was no feedback on whether a given 
response was correct or incorrect, or on points accrued.  
For data analysis, average response times were computed from raw data. 
Efficiency was defined as re-scaled (confined to lie between 0 and 1) expected value. 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for mean response times and efficiencies were 
computed using bootstrap methods (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Blocked task difficulty experiment (dashed lines = hard task, full lines = easy 
task). (A) Participant 2’s accuracy functions. 15 of 18 easy-hard accuracy function pairs 
were statistically different (includes comparisons for Fig. 4.5, see “SI Methods: Was the 
hard-easy manipulation successful?” for details).  (B) Participant 2’s efficiency curves 
with choices (circles). (C) Efficiency for each task difficulty for Participant 1-6. Gray 
bars = hard task. White bars = easy task. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% CI’s. The 
dashed line shows an efficiency level of .95. 
 
4.2.1.2 Results & discussion.  Fig. 4.2C shows efficiency as a function of task 
difficulty for each participant. As can be seen, most participants responded 
appropriately to the difficulty manipulation. In fact, four out of six participants have 
efficiencies near 1– regardless of whether the task is hard (gray bars) or easy (white 
bars). From the individual efficiency functions (Fig. S4.1), it is evident that participants 
made choices that indicate that they are sensitive to changes in task difficulty and are 
consistent (4/6 participants are near the peak for both hard and easy choices [one of 
these participants shows an aggressive bias] and 1 participant is consistently cautious). 
Thus, people appear to have good internal estimates of task performance and can use 
these to make efficient decisions. 
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4.2.2 Experiment 2: Motion discrimination & changes in rewards and penalties 
Like changes in task difficulty, changes in rewards and penalties influence the 
shape of the efficiency function. Increasing the penalty relative to the reward generally 
shifts the peak to the right (slower response times required), whilst decreasing it shifts 
the peak to the left (faster response times required). Past studies utilising reward 
structures with penalties and rewards of unequal magnitude have produced 
contradictory findings. Some results suggest that people do respond near-optimally 
(e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a; Navalpakkam et al., 2009) whereas others suggest 
that people deviate from optimality (e.g., Green & Swets, 1966; Ulehla, 1966; Maddox, 
2002).  
To establish that people are sensitive to changes in rewards and penalties, we 
initially compared choices for the neutral reward structure used above, to a standard 
reward-only condition (as in e.g., Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2010) and 
its reciprocal (penalty-only) in a pilot study
14
. The results suggested that people are 
sensitive to changes in rewards and penalties (e.g., if required to slow down they 
generally do), but that this sensitivity is somewhat limited (e.g., they slow down, but not 
by the right amount, see Fig. S4.2-3 for details).  
To explore this partial sensitivity, we sought to determine whether people are 
sensitive only to rank order information about values, as has been assumed in some 
models of decision making (Stewart, Chater & Brown, 2006), or whether they are also 
sensitive to the absolute magnitude of values. To this end, we presented participants 
with reward structures where the reward was always 1 point, but the penalty changed 
across consecutive conditions in a descending order. Some participants (1-5) received a 
strong manipulation: -24, -18, -12 and -6. Others (6-10) performed under a weak 
negative manipulation: -6, -4.5, -3 and -1.5. Based on the pilot study, we expected that 
people would appropriately choose shorter response times as penalty levels decrease (a 
within-subject effect). However, for the strong vs. weak between-subject manipulation 
there were at least two possible outcomes. If absolute magnitude matters, as it does in 
the optimal model, the strong manipulation should result in longer response times than 
the weak manipulation (and the two -6 conditions should overlap). If, on the other hand, 
only the ranks of values determine peoples’ choices, the two manipulations (strong and 
weak) should yield similar results. 
4.2.2.1 Methods. Ten members of the School of Psychology’s participant panel 
took part in one learning session and one experimental session (each 60 min). Pay was 
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 Conducted in conjunction with Experiment 4 reported on below. 
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identical to Experiment 1. The learning and the experimental sessions were similar to 
those of Experiment 1, with the exception that participants now experienced one task 
difficulty (coherence = 25%) and four different reward structures. Participants were 
randomly allocated to either the strong or the weak manipulation and completed two 
two-minute decision periods for each penalty level (presented in a descending order).  
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Ordinal reward manipulation. Average response time as a function of penalty 
level (x-axis) and between-subject penalty manipulation (triangles = weak, circles = 
strong). Error bars are standard errors suitable for between-subject comparisons.  
 
4.2.2.2 Results & discussion. First let us consider the average response times.  
As expected (see Fig. 4.3), participants appeared to speed up when penalties decreased. 
This within-subject trend was confirmed by a mixed-ANOVA (F(3, 24) = 8.29, p = .001 
, MSE = 13426; linear trend F(1, 8) = 10.4, p = .012, MSE = 28301). Comparing the 
average response times across the between-subject magnitude manipulation (compare 
triangles to circles in Fig. 4.3); it appears that higher penalties resulted in longer 
response times as predicted (a marginal effect; F(1,8) = 3.36, p = .0502, MSE = 312393, 
one-tailed). Furthermore, the strong -6 manipulation overlaps almost perfectly with the 
weak -6 manipulation - as expected if people were sensitive to absolute magnitude. The 
group analyses therefore indicate that people change their responding as a function of 
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penalty and (somewhat less conclusively) suggest that they are sensitivity to absolute 
magnitudes.  
Let us now turn to the more important question of how participants’ choices 
relate to the peak of the efficiency functions. As in the pilot study biases were evident. 
Participants slowed down, but tended to overreact to large penalties slowing down more 
than appropriate (see Fig. S4.4 for details). However, due to the shape of the underlying 
efficiency functions, these biases were not costly (see also Green, 1960; Winterfeldt & 
Edwards, 1968). The average efficiency for the penalty manipulation for the strong 
condition was .966 (SE=.018) and the average efficiency for the weak condition was 
.969 (SE= .011). 
 
4.3 Timing decisions based on perceptual and cognitive information 
compared 
Thus far, we have established that people are able to make perceptual time 
allocation decisions in the absence of feedback. They can make timing choices that are 
close to optimal whether the task is hard or easy. The ability to respond to unequal 
penalties and rewards appears good but biases are evident. We went on to compare 
timing decisions when the information they were based on was derived from low-level 
and higher-level tasks. In making these comparisons we restrict ourselves to a reward 
structure with equal rewards and penalties (1 and -1 respectively), for which choices 
were efficient and unbiased
15
.  
 
4.3.1 Experiment 3 – Motion discrimination, mental arithmetic & mental rotation  
To evaluate the effect of modality, from which the crucial information was 
derived, on timing decisions we employed two additional tasks (see SI Methods: 
Detailed methods for details). The first was a mental arithmetic task. It involved judging 
whether the sum of two integers was smaller or greater than 100. The second was a 
standard mental rotation task (Shepard & Metzler, 1967). This task involved judging 
whether two three-dimensional figures could be rotated mentally to bring them into 
alignment and incorporates both perceptual and cognitive components
16
.  
                                                     
15
 See Fig. S4.5 for evidence that the bias shown under unequal penalties and rewards (Fig. S2-S4) is not 
restricted to the perceptual domain.  
16
 The distinction between high and low processes/systems/tasks is fuzzy. In the limit, all low-level tasks 
incorporate some high-level components (and vice versa). We did not attempt a formal distinction, but 
simply used tasks that are conventionally considered one or the other. Motion discrimination is a widely 
used psychophysical task (e.g., Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), mental arithmetic is a core cognitive ability 
(see e.g., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales), and mental rotation would seem to sit in between, as it is 
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4.3.1.1 Methods. Five members of the School of Psychology’s participant panel 
took part in two learning sessions and two experimental sessions (60 min each). Pay 
was identical to Experiment 1. The learning and the experimental sessions were similar 
to those of the earlier experiments with the exception that participants now experienced 
three different tasks under one task difficulty and one reward structure (reward: 1, 
penalty: -1). Per experimental session, participants completed one two-minute decision 
period for all three tasks (in random order). Experiment 3 also included a pilot designed 
to test the effects of relative rewards (reported in the introduction to Experiment 2 and 
Fig. S4.2-3, S4.5
17
). 
  
 
Fig. 4.4. Decision making ability across three tasks. (A) Efficiency function for each 
participant (rows) and each task (columns). Circles represent response time choices. (B) 
Efficiencies across the three tasks for each participant (bars ordered as columns in A). 
The dotted line represents an efficiency level of .95. All error bars are bootstrapped 95% 
CI’s. Some error bars are too small to be visible at this scale. 
 
4.3.1.2 Results & discussion. Fig. 4.4A shows efficiency curves for motion 
discrimination, mental arithmetic and mental rotation respectively (columns) for each of 
the five participants in Experiment 3. As can be seen, the good performance for motion 
discrimination shown in Experiment 1 was replicated in this experiment (Column 1). 
Importantly, participants’ efficiencies for mental arithmetic (Column 2) and for mental 
rotation (Column 3) show that these tasks can also lead to very good performance. The 
data further suggest that participants’ choice consistency goes beyond specific tasks 
                                                                                                                                                           
associated with cognitive ability (Ozer, 1987), but seems to engage lower-level systems also (Cohen, 
Kosslyn, Breiter et al., 1996).  
17
 This pilot study also included a manipulation of the inter-stimulus interval.  
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(specifically, biases are evident across tasks, Participant 3 is consistently aggressive, 
Participant 2 & 5 are slightly too cautious). When decision making performance is 
compared across the different tasks (Fig. 4.4B, bars ordered as the columns in 4.4A), 
performance appears largely equivalent. In other words, performance was similar, 
whether the required knowledge was derived through perceptual or cognitive 
experience. 
 
4.3.2 Experiment 4 – Dynamic changes in task difficulty 
All manipulations so far have been between blocks (i.e. the experimental variables 
have been fixed for a block of trials). Everyday decision tasks rarely come partitioned 
according to task difficulty. A more realistic experiment might involve changes 
occurring on a trial-by-trial basis. Therefore, our final question was whether people can 
adjust dynamically to changes in task difficulty and whether they can do so regardless 
of the modality of the underlying task. To answer these questions, we ran variants of the 
motion discrimination task and the mental arithmetic task in which task difficulty 
changed unpredictably from trial to trial. 
4.3.2.1 Methods.  Six members of the School of Psychology’s participant panel 
took part in one learning sessions and two experimental sessions (60 min each). Pay was 
identical to Experiment 1. The learning and the experimental sessions were similar to 
Experiment 3, with the exception that participants now experienced both the motion 
discrimination and the mental arithmetic task under two task difficulties (easy and 
hard). Task difficulty for the motion discrimination task was manipulated as in 
Experiment 2. An easier mental arithmetic task was created by presenting integers of 5’s 
instead of 1’s (e.g., 35 and 60, rather than 34 and 63). The order in which the motion 
discrimination and mental arithmetic tasks were completed was randomized. 
4.3.2.2 Results & discussion. The manipulation of task difficulty within one 
and the same time-period requires a slightly different approach to the assessment of 
performance. For every pair of “easy” and “hard” trials, one could spend less time on 
one difficulty level, in order to spend more time on the other (see “SI Methods: 
Mathematical formulation of the decision problem” for details). Fig. 4.5A shows 
efficiency landscapes plots that take this into account. Choices that lie in the innermost 
region are at least 90% efficient. As can be seen, most participants compensate for 
dynamic changes in task difficulty and do so regardless of whether the underlying task 
is perceptual or cognitive. Participant 4 is too cautious and so falls outside the innermost 
region, however this behaviour is consistent across both task-types and levels of 
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difficulty. As in Experiment 3, the absolute efficiencies are similarly high across the 
two task types (Fig. 4.5B). 
 
 
Fig. 4.5. Dynamical task difficulty manipulation. (A) Efficiency space for motion 
discrimination (row 1) and mental arithmetic (row 2) for Participant 1-6 (columns). 
Black discs are response time choices. Concentric lines represent efficiency levels. 
Choices within the innermost line are at least 90% efficient. Everything inside the next 
line is at least 80% efficient and so on. (B) Absolute efficiency levels for both types of 
tasks (first bar = motion discrimination, second bar = mental arithmetic). Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% CI’s 
 
4.4 General discussion 
We explored people’s ability to make timing decisions for perceptual and 
cognitive tasks. Participants’ choices resulted in earnings that were very close to the 
earnings they would have received if they had, in fact, been optimal (although, in the 
context of unequal penalties and rewards, participants’ choices appear biased).  
Moreover, our participants responded appropriately to changes in task difficulty, and 
did so even when task difficulty changed on a trial-by-trial basis.  
Decisions also appeared equally efficient regardless of whether the underlying 
task was perceptual or cognitive. In our experiments, the modality dependent 
component came from participants’ knowledge about their own task performance. This 
knowledge was either of a perceptual or more cognitive nature. The type of decision 
(about time), and the reward information (abstract), was identical across the different 
underlying tasks. The highly similar performance, across lower and higher-level tasks, 
therefore suggests that knowledge was acquired, and used, in an equally proficient way 
whether it had a perceptual or a cognitive origin.  
Our comparison across perception and cognition was motivated by the perception-
cognition gap; low-level decisions appear near-optimal whereas higher-level decisions 
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appear sub-optimal. There are at least two explanations for the gap. The gap might be 
due to an underlying difference in competence (Trommershäuser et al. 2006; 2008). 
Alternatively, the gap might be a side-effect of the many methodological differences 
between low- and high-level decision making studies (Maloney, Trommershäuser & 
Landy, 2007). Differences exist both in terms of experimental methods (e.g., feedback, 
real stakes, Maloney et al., 2007) and in the way performance is assessed (i.e., violation 
of decision theoretic axioms vs. actual performance compared to optimal 
performance)
18
. 
Can our results shed light on the perception-cognition gap? The answer, it seems, 
depends on how timing decisions are viewed. If they are viewed as products of a highly 
specialized system that does timing decisions only, the answer is very little (the 
system’s ability to use perceptual and cognitive information equally efficiently 
notwithstanding). If, on the other hand, timing decisions are a result of a more general 
purpose decision system, our results would suggest that the previously reported gap, at 
least partly, is due to methodological differences.  
 Regardless of the true cause(s) of the perception-cognition gap, and the type of 
mechanism(s) that underlie timing decisions, our results show that timing decisions, 
whether based on perceptual or cognitive knowledge, can be performed near-optimally. 
Of course, our results do not prove that timing decisions are always near-optimal. In 
fact, the biases we found suggest that they are not. To return to the initial example; the 
hunter-gatherer, when looking for dangerous predators is likely to be too careful, but the 
cost of being too careful, in this situation, is much lower than the cost of being too 
careless. On the other hand, when choosing a way around a pond those costs are 
approximately equal. Judging by our results, the hunter-gatherer would have spent just 
the right amount of time at the pond, but a little too much time looking for dangerous 
predators – a sin he might easily be forgiven for. 
  
                                                     
18
 Relatedly, the decision from experience literature (for a review see Hertwig & Erev, 2009) has 
examined methodological differences within the cognitive domain (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003), finding 
that, for example, perceptual reward uncertainty (Shafir et al., 2008), and trial-by-trial rewards (Camilleri 
& Newell, 2011) affect how decisions deviate from expected utility theory. Here we have focussed on 
evaluating the actual efficiency with which decisions are made (as is typical in low-level studies), rather 
than attempting to find patterned deviations (as is typical in classical and decision from experience 
studies). 
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5. Interlude 2 
The four experiments reported on in Chapter 4 showed that timing decisions can 
be made very efficiently. Most of our participants earned nearly as much money as they 
would have earned if they had, in fact, been optimal. They were sensitive both to 
changes in task difficulty and changes in relative rewards. When we manipulated the 
nature of the underlying task, participants showed near-identical performance for 
perceptual and cognitive tasks. This latter finding is perhaps the most interesting from 
the perspective of this thesis. Minimally, it suggests that decisions about how much time 
to spend can be made efficiently, regardless of whether the required information is 
derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.  
The knowledge that our participants based their choices on was essentially 
equivalent to the probability information in standard decision-making paradigms. As 
discussed in General Introduction, there are two components to a good decision: 
probabilities and values. The probabilities for the timing decisions were either 
“cognitive” or “perceptual”, whilst the values and the decision type were identical. Of 
course, timing decisions require not only taking values and probabilities into account 
(see SI Equation 4.9), but this should make our results more and not less impressive. 
The previous chapter then shows that timing decisions can be performed efficiently, 
whether decisions involve probability information derived from low- or high-level 
tasks.  
In terms of the overarching goal of investigating the perception-cognition gap 
there are two potential shortcomings in the previous chapter. A first objection is that 
timing decisions may be “special". Given this possibility, one cannot, on the basis of our 
results, confidently infer that cognitive and perceptual decisions in general are equally 
good. Whilst this is true, it would be surprising if timing decisions were the only type of 
decisions for which the use of perceptual and cognitive information can be equally 
efficient. Nevertheless, intuition is not evidence.  
The second potential issue is that the previous series of experiments did not 
involve classical cognitive decisions (as in e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as a 
standard for comparison. That is, the tasks did not also include decisions for which the 
uncertainty information is provided in numerical format. This is a minor problem. If it 
were the case that decisions relying on acquired cognitive information in general were 
as good as those based an acquired perceptual information, but both were better than 
decisions based on numerical probabilities, this, in our minds, would be evidence 
against a general perception-cognition gap.  
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Nevertheless, the last piece of experimental work reported on here was designed 
to address directly these two potential objections. Specifically, the final study was based 
on the idea that the numerical probability information in standard classical paradigms 
can be replaced with equivalent information derived from participants’ ability to predict 
events on the basis of experience. An example is Fox and Tversky’s (1998) study in 
which they trained participants to predict fictional inflation and interest rate movements. 
The participants were later asked to choose between options for which the probability 
information had been replaced by inflation and interest rate information. Wu et al. 
(2009) used a similar methodology but instead replaced numerical probabilities with 
perceptuo-motor targets (that participants had been trained to hit).  
As noted in Footnote 11, Wu et al. (2009) conducted two experiments. In one they 
tested whether the degree to which the independence axiom is violated differs across 
perceptuo-motor and classical decisions. They found that the axiom tended to be 
violated to similar extents for both types of decisions. In a second experiment they 
found that best fitting parameters of cumulative prospect theory (see Chapter 6 for a 
description) suggested that participants underweight low probabilities for perceptuo-
motor decisions and overweight low probabilities classical decisions.  
Interestingly, Fox and Tversky’s (1998) results dissociate from those of Wu et al. 
(2009). Fox and Tversky’s results suggest that choices based on learnt probabilities are 
equivalent to ones based on numerical probabilities, whereas Wu et al.’s (2009) do not. 
One possible explanation for this difference is that Fox and Tversky took into account 
peoples’ subjective beliefs whilst Wu et al. assumed that the subjective probabilities 
matched the objective ones. This is a hypothesis that will receive indirect support in the 
next chapter. 
The next chapter might also be viewed as relevant for another decision-making 
dissociation in the literature: the description-experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
The description-experience gap describes the apparent tendency for human choices to 
depend on whether options are experienced or described. A large cognitive literature 
(see Hertwig & Erev, 2009 and Rakow & Newell, 2010 for reviews) has grown from the 
finding that when outcomes of actions are experienced decisions show qualitatively 
different patterns compared to when outcomes are verbally described (given in 
numerical format). One potential shortcoming of such comparisons is that people have 
the opportunity to learn expected values directly in the decision from experience 
literature (unlike the studies of Fox & Tversky and Wu et al. cited above). This means 
that the argument presented in General Introduction, about how such choice situations 
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are radically different from the ones in the classical literature, applies with full force. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Wu et al. (2009) obtained the same probability 
weighting functions for their pointing task that have been reported repeatedly within the 
decision from experience literature (see e.g., Ungemach et al., 2009) – although Wu et 
al. themselves did not draw out this link. 
In the next study, we, like Fox and Tversky (1998) and Wu et al. (2009), let our 
participants learn about their own task performance. Our participants completed both 
perceptuo-motor (pointing) and cognitive (mental arithmetic) learning tasks. In a 
separate decision session they made hypothetical choices between many pair-wise 
options. They did not receive any feedback on their choices and could therefore not 
learn a particular response strategy through feedback. In other words, the decision 
session was typical of those in the classical literature, with the exception that each 
participant made many such choices and one of the chosen options ways played out “for 
real” at the end of the experiment (i.e., choices were consequential). The next chapter 
describes the, to the best of our knowledge, first study to systematically apply both the 
type of performance standard applied in low-level decision studies and the performance 
standards applied in high-level decision studies, across three precisely matched low- 
and high-level decisions tasks. 
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6. The Gaps That Weren’t: The Perception-Cognition & The 
Description-Experience Gap 
As noted throughout this thesis, decades of research suggest that people do not 
maximize expected utility (e.g., Allais, 1952/1979; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1992). Classical studies, which 
demonstrate sub-optimal decision making, typically ask participants to make 
hypothetical choices between pairs of options. You might be asked if you prefer option 
A1: “£4000 with a probability of .8”, or option B1: “£3000 with certainty”.  Your next 
decision might be between option A2: “£4000 with a probability of .2” and option B2: 
“£3000 with a probability of .25”. The latter pair is derived by dividing each probability 
in the first pair by 4. If you are like most people, you prefer B1 and A2, and your 
preferences are inconsistent with expected utility theory (specifically, they violate the 
independence axiom, see Allais, 1952/1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). By asking 
people to make such pair-wise choices, researchers have uncovered many departures 
from optimal decision making. More recently, however, two other decision making 
paradigms have produced results that seem to diverge dramatically from the classical 
ones.  
The first of these paradigms will be highly familiar by now. In sharp contrast to 
the classical studies, recent studies of decision making in perceptuo-motor 
(Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2003a,2003b)  and perceptual (Whitely & 
Sahani, 2008; Navalpakkam, Koch & Perona, 2009, Navalpakkam, Koch, Rangel & 
Perona, 2010) domains typically report optimal or near-optimal decisions. Like the 
classical studies, these studies provide participants with numerical value information. 
However, the numerical probability information is replaced by analogous information 
derived from lower level systems (see below for an example). Thus, it seems that low-
level decisions based on internal estimates of probability are near-optimal, whereas 
high-level decisions based on numerical probabilities are sub-optimal: the perception-
cognition gap (Trommershäuser, Landy & Maloney, 2006; Trommershäuser, Maloney 
& Landy, 2008).  
Secondly, within more cognitive contexts, “decisions from experience” dissociate 
from the classical so-called “decisions from description”: the description-experience 
gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010). This gap is, unlike the 
perception-cognition gap, not about levels of performance. Instead this gap refers to 
people behaving as if they overweight low probabilities in the classical experiments, and 
as if they underweight low probabilities when relying on experience. In the latter 
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experiments, participants experience outcomes in the form of monetary rewards. 
Typically participants get to sample two computer buttons, each generating monetary 
outcomes with some probability. One button might return £32 with a probability of .1, 
and the other £3 with certainty (e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004). After 
sampling both buttons, participants choose which button to play for real money.19 Had 
participants been presented with the above options in numerical format (as in the 
classical studies) ~50% would have chosen the certain option. In contrast, when relying 
on experienced outcomes ~80% choose the certain option (Hertwig et al., 2004).  
The underlying causes of both of these “gaps” have attracted considerable 
attention (Maloney et al., 2007; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010), but are 
far from resolved. Moreover, each “gap” has been pursued largely in isolation, but the 
relationship between the two literatures is of importance. Both literatures involve choice 
tasks that are based on implicit, or learnt, probability information (unlike the classical 
paradigm within decision-making research, but see Fox & Tversky, 1998) and both 
typically involve extensive feedback (again, unlike the classical paradigm).  
Although, low-level decision making paradigms typically find optimal 
performance (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2008), and the decisions-from-experience 
paradigm finds deviations from the optimal strategy (Hertwig & Erev, 2009), recent 
results suggest that similar deviations from optimality may obtain in both paradigms 
(i.e., underweighting of low probabilities, compare Wu, Delgado & Maloney, 2009 and 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). It is therefore tempting to conclude that a converging picture is 
emerging, namely, one in which decisions based on numerical probabilities dissociate 
from decisions based on internal estimates of probabilities (but see Fox & Tversky, 
1998), and, furthermore, where tasks involving internal estimates behave in potentially 
similar ways, regardless of where in the cognitive system that internal estimate resides. 
However, as we argue next, confounds exists which suggest that such an inference may 
be premature.   
Firstly, in contrast to classical studies (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
participants are typically given the opportunity to learn how to choose. Some 
researchers interested in low-level decisions are aware of this, and present evidence 
against the use of learning strategies in their work (e.g., Trommershäuser et al. 2003a). 
In decision from experience studies, however, this is rarely considered a problem. In 
these studies, participants could potentially learn which of the two buttons to prefer by 
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 Variants of this sampling paradigm in which each “sample” is played out for real with varying levels of 
feedback are also used, see Hertwig & Erev (2009). Note also that Hertwig et al. 2004 paid participants in 
€ and not £. 
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tracking how much money each button returns on average (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer & 
Hertwig, 2008). If such a tallying approach were taken, a direct trade-off between 
probabilities and values, as in the classical studies, would not be needed. Instead, the 
decision problem reduces to a choice between two expected values. The possibility that 
classical decision studies and the two more recent literatures investigate phenomena that 
are sub-served by functionally dissociable systems - a more simple learning system 
(available to humans, but also e.g., mice Thorndike, 1911) and a more complex system 
relying on representations of probabilities and values (as in classical studies) - suggests 
both that contrasts should be made with care and that “dissociations” may potentially be 
unsurprising.   
Secondly, for the perception-cognition gap in particular, there is a real possibility 
that the gap is caused by methodological differences in study design (see e.g., Maloney 
et al., 2007) and/or differences in how performance is assessed. The latter possibility is 
rarely considered. Lower-level decision studies typically evaluate how closely people’s 
earnings match those of a hypothetical optimal agent (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 
2003). This contrasts with both classical and experience-based studies, which do not 
evaluate actual performance, but look for patterned deviations from optimality (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). It is conceivable that the two 
ways of analysing performance produce different answers: one which characterizes 
human decision making as near-optimal, and one which characterizes it as sub-optimal. 
This result might obtain if, for example, patterned deviations, such as those found in 
classical studies, are not very costly.  
The fundamental question we seek to explore is whether there really is robust 
evidence for “gaps”. To probe the issue, we compared three types of decisions under 
precisely matched conditions: classical decisions, decisions for which the numerical 
probability information was replaced with participants’ estimates of their performance 
on a low-level perceptual task (specifically, a standard pointing task) and decisions 
where the probability information involved estimates of participants’ own performance 
on a high-level task (specifically, a novel arithmetic task). In keeping with the classical 
studies, our design did not allow for an expected value learning strategy. To our 
knowledge, ours is also the first study applying both low- and high-level standards of 
performance to precisely matched tasks. This allowed us to test directly the idea that the 
perception-cognition gap might simply be due to the application of different standards.  
To preview the results: As in the lower-level decision making studies our 
participants made highly efficient decisions. Crucially, performance was equally good 
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across low-level, high-level and classical tasks. When we fit cumulative prospect theory 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), a model that has been used to account both for decisions 
from experience and decisions from description, we nevertheless detected patterned 
deviations from optimality. When we fit objective probabilities, the deviations were as 
predicted by the description-experience gap. However, participants’ subjective beliefs 
did not match objective probabilities. When participants’ biases were taken into 
account, decisions from experience showed the same systematic deviations as classical 
decisions typically do. 
 
6.1 Methods 
6.1.1 Participants and apparatus 
Eighteen members of the School’s participant panel were paid £6/hr (plus a 
possible bonus of £0-£6) to participate.  Each participant took part in two learning 
sessions each lasting 45 minutes and one decision session lasting 1 hour. Ten 
participants came back approximately two weeks later for a repeat decision session.  
Informed consent was obtained and the study was approved by the School’s 
Ethics Committee. A Wacom tablet was used for the pointing task. Experiments were 
written in Matlab using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard & 
Pelli, 2007).  
 
6.1.2 Stimuli, design & procedure  
The experiment involved two parts and made use of the idea that standard 
decision tasks can be altered to instead require participants to use their own internal 
estimates of probabilities (see Fox & Tversky, 1998; Wu et al., 2009) and was broadly 
based on Wu et al.’s Experiment 2. First, participants practised two tasks (mental 
arithmetic and pointing) in separate counterbalanced sessions. These sessions allowed 
participants to learn about their own task performance. The second part was a decision 
making session. It involved three tasks: a classical decision task with numerical 
probability information and two tasks in which the numerical probability information 
was replaced with equivalent low-level (perceptuo-motor) and high-level (mental 
arithmetic) information. In other words, participants saw exactly the same decision 
problems across all three tasks. 
Participants’ goal in the learning sessions was to earn as many points as possible. 
To get points, participants had to hit mental arithmetic and pointing targets under time 
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pressure (details below). Target hits were awarded 100 points, misses were not 
penalized and late responses cost -700 points. Participants were instructed to earn as 
many points as possible, but were told that learning about their own performance was at 
least as important as earning points. It was emphasized that improved knowledge would 
enable them to make better decisions in the third session, and that those decisions would 
have real financial implications. 
The arithmetic task involved summing up four numbers (central numbers, Fig. 
6.1A). Participants typed their response (to the nearest integer) on a virtual keypad (not 
shown here).  Arithmetic targets were defined relative to the sum of the four presented 
numbers. A target of ±6 (Fig 6.1A, B), for example, meant that the difference between 
the judged sum and the actual sum had to be smaller than ±6 to count as a “hit”. After 
having responded participants received feedback on how far their judgement was from 
the actual sum (Fig. 6B).  
The pointing session involved pointing towards targets in the frontal plane and 
was based on Wu et al.’s (2009) pointing task. To score a hit, participants had to hit 
anywhere on the shaded bar in Fig. 6.1 D (illustrating a pointing target). Pointing targets 
were displayed in random locations and made sufficiently tall so that only variability 
along the x-axis mattered. Feedback consisted of a high-contrast disc showing where the 
screen was hit (Fig. 1E). To encourage participants they also received explicit “hit” and 
“miss” feedback after each trial (Fig 6.1B & E) for both tasks.  
The target centre in the pointing task was the midline of targets. The target centre 
in the arithmetic task was the sum. Because time was limited, participants were not able 
to perform either task with full accuracy. Subtracting the target centre from each 
response results in error distributions (Fig. 6.1 C, F) describing the accuracy and 
precision of individual participants’ responses. These can be used to predict 
participants’ chances of hitting targets, both pointing and numerical, of varying 
“widths”. 
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Fig. 6.1. Experimental paradigm. Panels A-F illustrate learning sessions. Panel A: 
Mental arithmetic stimuli. The task involved summing the four central numbers. The 
judged sum had to be within the limits of the target (±6 here) to be scored a hit. The 
total number of points earned was displayed to the right. Panel B: Mental arithmetic 
feedback. Feedback included the error (difference between the judged and true sum, -
2.1 here) and explicit hit/miss information. Panel C: An arithmetic error distribution 
(Participant 10). Panel D: Pointing stimuli. The bar represents the target and “Points 
500” illustrates the cumulative score information. Panel E: Pointing feedback included 
explicit hit/miss information as well as a high-contrast indication of where the screen 
was hit (black disc here). Panel F: A pointing error distribution (Participant 10). Panel 
G-I illustrate the decision session. Panel G:  two choice options with probabilities 
replaced by pointing targets. Panel H: two choice options with probabilities replaced by 
arithmetic targets. Panel I: two classical choice options with numerical probabilities. 
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The decision session involved choices between pairs of options (Fig 6.1G-I). Each 
option contained probability information in one of three formats: low-level (pointing, 
Fig. 6.1G), high-level (mental-arithmetic, Fig. 6.1H) and classical (numerical, Fig. 6.1I) 
as well as value information. There were 120 option-pairs for each format presented in a 
randomized order with no time limit. For each pair, participants indicated whether they 
preferred the left or the right option. Importantly, pairs of options were matched across 
the tasks. That is, each classical option had an exact equivalent in the cognitive and the 
perceptuo-motor domain (target widths were adjusted such that target hit probabilities 
matched classical probabilities for each participant).   
Target hit probabilities were matched to classical probabilities as follows: Target 
widths corresponding to objective hit probabilities were estimated from response 
distributions (as illustrated in Fig. 6.1 C & F, 300 data points per participant and task) 
by fitting Gaussians and using numerical methods to find the target width corresponding 
to each reference probability (integrating the fit Gaussian over target widths). For all but 
one participant, who showed a quite peaked distribution for the mental arithmetic task, 
the normality assumption was well met.  
Unlike most previous studies (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ungemach et al.. 
2009; Wu et al. 2009; Camilleri & Newell, 2011, but see Erev, Roth, Slonim & Barron, 
2002), we used randomly selected choice options. Probabilities were drawn from the 
range .05 to .95 (in steps of .05). Values were drawn from £1 and £3 to £54 (in steps of 
£3). This resulted in options with a wide range of differences in expected values. 
 Of the 120 option-pairs, 5 were pairs in which one option dominated the other 
(i.e., both probability and value was higher for one option). Most participants chose the 
dominating option most of the time (mean number out of 5 = 4.85, min=4, max=5), 
indicating that participants paid attention and understood the decision task. 
Participants did not receive feedback but knew that one of their chosen options 
would be randomly selected at the end (with values decreased by a tenth) and played for 
real money. They also knew that the probabilities used to generate the real outcome 
would be based on their own performance in the learning sessions.  
 
6.2 Results & discussion 
6.2.1 How good were people’s choices? 
We first sought to determine how good participants’ choices were using metrics 
commonly employed in low-level decision studies. The perception-cognition gap 
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implies that people will make much better choices when they are faced with low-level 
decisions compared to when faced with classical decisions, or compared to when faced 
with decisions based on high-level information.  
To achieve results comparable to low-level studies, and because expected value 
maximization might be considered normative in typical decision making studies (Rabin, 
2000, Rabin & Thaler, 2001), we evaluated how close participants came to maximizing 
expected value. An expected value maximizer chooses the option that will return the 
most reward in the long run. As expected value maximization does not allow weighting 
of objective values it is a stricter normative standard than expected utility maximization.  
 
 
Fig. 6.2. Performance metrics as a function of task. Panel A. The proportion of choices 
maximizing expected value for each participant (gray discs) and the group average 
(black squares). Error bars are parametric 95% confidence intervals.  Panel B. The 
proportion of choices maximizing expected value for each task as a function of the 
difference in expected value of the choices options (discriminability) pooled across 
participants. Panel C. Efficiency for each participant (gray discs) and the group average 
(black squares). Error bars are parametric 95% confidence intervals. Gray discs 
representing individuals have been jittered laterally. 
 
Fig. 6.2A shows the proportion of optimal choices both for individual participants 
(grey discs) and the average proportion of optimal choices for each task (black squares). 
As can be seen, the average proportion of choices that maximized expected value was 
approximately .75 - regardless of task. Note also that there were large individual 
differences. 
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An average optimal choice rate of .75 is moderately impressive. However, 
expected value maximization implies that the decision maker is able to perfectly 
discriminate between choice options (as does expected utility theory). It is implausible 
that humans can achieve perfect discrimination. Indeed, previous studies have found 
that choice consistency increases when choice options become more discriminable (i.e., 
when the difference in utility between choice options increases, see e.g., Mosteller & 
Nogee, 1951).  
As Fig. 6.2B shows, the proportion of optimal choices amongst our participants 
increased as choice options became more discriminable (i.e., the expected value 
difference increased). Note, increasing differences between choice options does not only 
affect people’s ability to discriminate, it is also related to the potential loss of making an 
incorrect choice. The easier it is to discriminate between options the more costly 
mistakes become, and conversely the harder the discrimination the less costly the 
mistakes. If participants choose the wrong option mainly when options are hard to 
discriminate Fig. 6.2A may give an overly pessimistic picture of participants’ choice 
performance. 
Fig. 6.2C shows our participants expected earnings relative to a hypothetical 
participant who always chooses optimally (i.e., relative to someone who always chooses 
the option with the highest expected value). Efficiency, or actual gains over gains 
achieved by an optimal participant, is the standard performance metric in lower-level 
decision studies (e.g., Trommershäuser et al., 2003a). As can be seen, the average 
participant is expected to earn ~92% of the optimal earnings (with some expected to 
earn nearer to 98%). Thus, whatever choice strategies our participants used – they were 
nearly as efficient as the optimal one. 
Fig. 6.2C also suggests that there were next to no differences in performance 
across the three tasks. For statistical comparisons when the null hypothesis is of interest 
Bayesian tests are appropriate (Gallistel 2009, Rouder et al., 2009). A comparison using 
JZS-Bayes factors (Roeder et al., 2009) supports the hypotheses of equal efficiency 
levels across the three tasks (Cognitive Vs Pointing: Bayes Factor = 5.59, t(17) = -.249, 
p = .81; Cognitive Vs Classical: Bayes Factor = 5.3, t(17) = .335, p = .74; Pointing vs. 
Classical: Bayes Factor = 3.56, t(17) = .979, p = .34).  
Thus, we found evidence against the perception-cognition gap. Performance was 
equally good across low- and high-level decisions. Moreover, because performance was 
just as good in the classical task, the results also imply an upper bound on the 
description-experience gap. That is, although equal performance does not imply equal 
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process, equal performance implies that any differences in process are inconsequential 
behaviourally. 
 
6.2.2 Do people deviate systematically from optimality? 
We next sought to determine whether, despite the equally good performance, 
differences in choice strategies could be detected. Specifically, we sought to determine 
whether there were differences in how probabilities were treated across the three tasks - 
as predicted by the description-experience gap. Any decision model that allows for 
under and overweighting of probabilities could in principle be used to test for 
differences in probability weighting.  
We fit cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), a model 
commonly used to account for deviations from optimal decision making. Two key 
aspects of the theory are its value and probability weighting functions. These functions 
map objective quantities onto subjective quantities, and so allow subjective values and 
probabilities to deviate systematically from objective ones. These aspects allow it to 
account for many of the empirically observed deviations from optimal choice.  
Briefly, we used the parameterization recommended in Stott (2006): a Prelec 
(1998) one-parameter probability weighting function, a power value weighting function 
and a one-parameter logistic choice function. The choice function captures the fact that 
people are less-than-perfectly sensitive to differences between options (see Fig 6.2 B). 
The model was fit separately to each participant and task minimizing the log-likelihood. 
For additional details and a model-exploration using seven other parameterizations see 
SI Additional methods: Model fitting.  
Because the description-experience gap manifests itself in differences in 
probability weighting, and because value weighting is generally not considered sub-
optimal (but see Rabin, 2000), we focus on the best-fit probability weights in the 
following. 
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Fig. 6.3. Best fit value and probability weights. Row 1, Column 1-3: Participants’ best 
fit value weights (gray lines) and group averages (black dashed lines)
20
. Row 2, Column 
1-3: Participants’ best fit probability weights (gray lines) and group averages (black 
dashed lines). Circles = perceptuo-motor, triangles = mental arithmetic and squares = 
classical.  
 
Fig. 6.3 shows the best fit value (row 1) and probability (row 2) weighting 
functions for each task and participant. Two trends are noteworthy. Firstly, the average 
probability weighting function (dashed lines, row 2), suggests underweighting of low 
probabilities for the pointing and arithmetic task, but suggests overweighting for 
decisions from description (i.e., “classical”) – thus seemingly replicating the 
description-experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009)
21
 and replicating previous results 
comparing perceptuo-motor decisions to classical ones (Wu et al., 2009; 2011).   
                                                     
20
 Group averages are exponents of the 50% trimmed mean on the logarithm of individual weights. This 
method accounts for the fact that the weights have qualitative different meanings in the range 0-1 and in 
the range 1 to infinity. 
21
 Note that although underweighting of rare events is considered a characteristic of decisions from 
experience (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010) the picture emerging from studies that fit 
(cumulative) prospect theory in order to evaluate underweighting, instead of inferring underweighting 
from peoples’ choice patterns (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004), is somewhat mixed. Whilst some studies find 
probability weighting parameters suggestive of underweighting (e.g., Ungemach et al., 2009; Camilleri & 
Newell, 2011) others find weights suggesting only very marginal (i..e, near-linear) underweighting (e.g., 
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The second noteworthy trend is that, consistent with previous studies (Wu & 
Gonzales, 1998; Wu et al., 2009; 2011), there were large individual differences. Some 
participants appear near-optimal with near-linear probability weights, whereas others 
show severe under- or overweighting. Specifically, for neither decision from 
experience, nor for decisions from description, is there a consistent pattern of only 
under- or overweighting.  
If these individual differences are consistent and not, for example, due to noise, 
using a given participant’s best-fit parameters for one task (e.g., classical), to predict 
their choices in another task (e.g., pointing) should yield better predictions, compared to 
predicting the same participant’s choices using the average best-fit parameters for one 
and the same task (e.g., classical).  
To test this, we predicted each participant’s choices using the average best-fit 
parameters for the same task (exponent of the 50% trimmed mean [excluding the 
predicted participant] log parameter value). This resulted in an 18x3 matrix of log-
likelihoods. We summed across tasks to create an aggregate measure of within-task-
between-subject predictability for each of the 18 participants.  
We also predicted each participant’s choices for each task using their best-fit 
parameters for each other task. This resulted in 2 predictions for each task and each 
participant (e.g., predicting classical from arithmetic and pointing). We averaged over 
the two predictions for each task and summed over tasks producing, as for the within-
task case, a vector with 18 data points for between-task-within-subject predictability. 
We compared the vectors using a paired t-test having removed three outliers (see 
SI Fig. S6.1). The test shows that if we want to predict your choices for a particular 
task, it is better to measure your responses for an alternative task, compared to trying to 
predict your responses on the basis of other people’s choices for the same task (t(14) = 
5.66, p < .0001). This suggests that the differences in average probability weights across 
tasks (dashed lines, Fig. 6.3, row 2) are of limited importance. 
 
6.2.3 Are peoples subjective beliefs calibrated? 
                                                                                                                                                           
Hau et al., 2008), whilst others find overweighting (e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006; Abdellaoui, L’Haridon, & 
Paraschiv, 2011). Without systematic study it is difficult to trace the origin of these differences. The 
studies often differ substantially both in design and analysis methods. However, note that we use a large 
number of different choice options, fit individual choice data in a setting where expected value learning 
strategies have been ruled out and use a maximum-likelihood approach which essentially avoids the 
problem of flat maxima (c.f., e.g., Ungemach et al., 2009). Importantly, we replicate studies employing a 
similarly powerful design and analysis methods (see e.g., Wu et al., 2009). 
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In the learning sessions our participants were not only given the chance to learn 
about their task performance, but were also explicitly asked about their beliefs about 
their performance. Every 50
th
 trial (300 in total), we asked participants to adjust target 
widths so that they thought they would hit them 95%, 75%, 50%, 25% and 5% of the 
time. If participants’ subjective probabilities match objective ones they would, for 
example, upon being asked for a 50% target width, report a target width that would 
allow them to hit the target ~50% of the time. If they do this, they are calibrated. If they 
set a target width that is too wide, or too narrow, they are not calibrated and their beliefs 
do not (fully) match reality. 
The previous model fitting assumed that people’s internal beliefs about 
uncertainties match objective ones. Some studies have assessed whether their 
participants were calibrated as a group and often (e.g., Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer & Hertwig, 
2008; Ungemach, Chater & Stewart, 2009; Gottlieb, Weiss & Chapman, 2007; Wu et 
al., 2009), but not always (e.g., Fox & Tversky, 1998; Wu, Delgado & Maloney, 2011), 
they are.  
A group, however, might be perfectly calibrated on average, yet have every 
member showing substantial biases (Fig. S6.2). In other words, to assess calibration of 
individuals, one needs to look at individual calibration. Moreover, the task used here 
required participants to use general task knowledge to derive probability information. 
This is very different from tracking frequencies of specific events (e.g., how many times 
out of 40 one obtained £3 when pressing a particular button, Ungemach et al., 2009). 
Either, or both of these factors, may be responsible for the relatively good calibration 
evidenced in some previous studies. 
Fig. 6.3A-D shows the relationship between subjective width ratings (gray 
symbols) and objective widths (white symbols) for two representative participants. 
Participant 16 (Row 1), who represents the most common pattern, generally 
overestimated target widths required to match the reference hit probabilities. Participant 
12’s (Row 2) judgments show a less common pattern best described as regressive (see 
Fig. S6.3 for plots of all participants’ judgments). 
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Fig 6.4. Calibration of two representative participants. Row 1 = Participant 16, Row 2 = 
Participant 12. Panel A-D. Target widths matching reference probabilities (objective), 
and target widths judged to match reference probabilities (subjective = average of the 
last 5 of 6 width judgments). Panel E&F. Subjective hit probabilities as a function of 
objective hit probabilities.  
 
Fig. 6.4E and F shows these same biases expressed as participants’ belief in their 
ability to hit targets as a function of their actual ability. Participant 16 generally 
underestimated their ability, whilst Participant 12 underestimated their ability for hard 
targets and overestimated their ability for easy targets. Note also the intra-subject 
consistency in biases across tasks. When averaged across participants, the group bias 
(Fig. S6.4) is similar to Participant 16’s and to some previous group-average results 
(Wu et al., 2011). 
 
6.2.4 Do people deviate from optimality when biases are taken into account? 
The description-experience gap is typically evaluated under the assumption that 
objective probabilities correspond to subjective probabilities (see e.g., Camilleri & 
Newell, 2011, and perceptuo-motor studies have assumed the same (Wu et al. 2009; 
2011). If subjective probabilities are not calibrated, biases and not underlying changes 
in preferences may underlie the gaps. This is particularly relevant as the average 
participant showed a general underestimation of probabilities (Fig. S6.3, see also Wu et 
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al., 2011). Perhaps, underweighting in decision from experience studies can be 
accounted for by this bias?   
To test this idea, we repeated the model fitting having replaced the objective 
probabilities for each choice option with probabilities estimated from participants’ 
subjective ratings. We used Weibull functions to extrapolate from subjects’ width 
ratings subjective probabilities other than those corresponding to the reference 
probabilities. As can be seen in Fig. S6.3, Weibull functions generally capture the width 
ratings well. 
 
 
Fig. 6.5. Best fit probability weight parameters (based on subjective probabilities). Row 
1: Participants’ best fit probability weights (gray lines) and group averages (black 
dashed lines). Circles = perceptuo-motor, triangles = mental arithmetic and squares = 
classical. Group averages are exponents of the 50% trimmed mean on the logarithm of 
individual probability weights.  
 
When subjective rather than objective probabilities are fit the results change 
dramatically (Fig. 6.5). Now, most participants appear to overweight small probabilities 
– just as they do when probabilities are given explicitly. Of course, the above fits (Fig. 
6.5 & Fig. 6.3) are due to one particular parameterization of cumulative prospect theory 
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(the one recommended in Stott, 2006). Thus, it is possible that the above results obtain 
only with this particular parameterization. The space of possible parameterizations is 
large (Stott alone tested 256 different parameterizations). It is not feasible to search the 
entire model space, but we nevertheless sought to verify that the results above do not 
depend on choosing a particular model instantiation. We provide details on this test in 
“SI Additional model fits” and note here that a comparison across eight different 
parameterizations produces results concordant with Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.3.  
Another potential caveat is the relationship between reported probability 
judgments and choices. It is possible that our participants were simply bad at reporting 
their beliefs. That is, the probabilities participants reported and the probabilities they 
based their choices on might dissociate. This does not appear to be the case. A simple 
model, assuming expected value maximization and less-than-perfect discrimination, 
generally better accounts for the data when subjective probabilities are fit, relative to 
when objective probabilities are fit (Fig. S6.5) – indicating that subjective probability 
estimates provide meaningful information over and above objective probabilities. 
 
6.3 Summary 
We compared decisions based on three different types of probability information, 
low-level (perceptuo-motor), high-level (mental arithmetic) and numerical, under 
identical conditions. We found evidence against the perception-cognition gap. Our 
participants equally made highly efficient decisions when relying upon perceptuo-motor 
knowledge, upon cognitive knowledge or on numerical probabilities. We nevertheless 
replicated the description-experience gap when fitting objective probabilities. However, 
subjective probabilities did not match objective probabilities. When people’s biases 
were taken into account, there was no gap. In fact, when biases were taken into account, 
both decisions from experience (whether cognitive of perceptuo-motor) and classical 
decisions showed the same overweighting of small probabilities.  
What factors might explain the discrepancy between our results and previous 
results in support of decision making “gaps”? Arguably, the most parsimonious 
explanation for the perception-cognition gap lies in the very different methods by which 
performance has been assessed. Indeed, when we used the standard low-level methods, 
that of evaluating actual choice performance, we found that although participants were 
not precisely optimal, they were nevertheless highly efficient. In contrast, when we fit 
cumulative prospect theory, many participants had probability weights that were 
substantially different from 1, suggesting that they sub-optimally weight probabilities. 
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Thus, we were able to show both “good” performance (using standard low-level 
metrics) and “bad” performance (using standard high-level metrics) for both low- and 
high-level decisions. 
The reason for the absence of a description-experience gap is perhaps less clear. 
We replicated the gap with objective probabilities, but not when fitting subjective 
probabilities. This might be taken to imply that the gap has arisen because it is 
erroneously assumed that subjective probabilities match objective ones. However, as 
noted in the introduction, standard decision-from-experience paradigms have a potential 
learning component that might also explain the gap. In that paradigm, participants also 
learn frequencies and do have to use task-relevant knowledge to estimate probabilities 
as our participants did (the former is knowledge specific to a particular button, the latter 
involves generalisation from task knowledge to any number of possible targets). Any of 
these factors might account for the different results. The potential role of learning in 
decision-from-experience tasks, however, means that the decision task used here is 
closer to the classical tasks. It might therefore be argued that the present study 
represents a better test of the description-experience gap. 
Incidentally, there is much current debate about whether people have stable 
preferences (see e.g. a recent special issue: Schaik, Kusev & Juliusson, 2011). If they do 
not, fitting models assuming that they do (such as cumulative prospect theory or 
expected utility theory) is non-sensical. Two weeks after the decision session we asked 
our participants if they would come back for another session and 10 did. We correlated 
each participant’s 120 choices in Session 1 with their choices in Session 2 (the option-
pairs were presented in a different random order). The choices were highly correlated 
across the two sessions (mean r = .6 for pointing, r=.58 for arithmetic, r=.64 for 
classical, 54 p-values < .0001, 1 p-value = .018). For each of the three tasks, three 
participants reported changing their choice strategy across the two sessions. When these 
participants are excluded the mean correlations increase substantially (mean r = .69 for 
pointing, r=.68 for arithmetic, r=.71 for classical). This shows that past choices predict 
future choices and suggests that people know something about their own choice 
consistency. 
Despite equally good performance across tasks, despite the same apparent sub-
optimal weighting of probabilities across tasks, and despite the relative stability of 
preferences across time, our results do not imply that decisions made using different 
modalities, or on the basis of different kinds of information, are identical. It is, for 
example, conceivable that decisions can be shown to differ across modalities when tasks 
87 
 
are tweaked specifically for this purpose. Moreover, our participants made perceptuo-
motor decisions faster than they made either mental arithmetic or classical decisions 
(see Fig. S6.6). One might speculate that this is because probability information in the 
guise of perceptuo-motor targets is easier to discriminate. Either way, the fact that 
perceptuo-motor decisions were faster suggests that the processes underlying the 
decisions are not identical. Nevertheless, our results question whether such differences 
merit the distinction “gap”. In the most important way – that of actual earnings – there 
was no difference across the tasks. Importantly, because efficiencies were high, the 
ways in which people do deviate from optimal decision making do not seem particularly 
costly. Put another way, people may not be perfectly rational, but their irrationalities do 
not seem to lead them far astray from optimality. 
  
88 
 
7. General Discussion 
7.1 Summary of empirical work 
We began by reporting on a perceptuo-motor study (Chapter 2), in which we 
showed that optimality standards, commonly employed by those studying lower-level 
decision-making, are not absolute but relative. Performance standards are conditional 
upon the specifics of the tasks employed and the assumptions included in ones model. 
This meant that we could not, as first intended, use such ideal observer models as 
absolute standards. This, in turn, meant that we could not (without complication) use 
ideal observers to compare performance across perceptual and cognitive tasks. Instead, 
we had to find a way to design tasks such that perceptual and cognitive ability could be 
fairly compared.   
We did this in the next series of experiments by evaluating how good people were 
at making decisions about how much time to spend on the task at hand (Chapter 4). 
Because the task at hand can be any task, we could compare peoples timing decisions, 
with no feedback and abstract reward structures, when the underlying task was either 
perceptual or of a more cognitive nature. In other words, we designed experiments for 
which the decision task and the reward information were identical across “modalities”, 
but for which the knowledge that decisions were based on was either perceptual or 
cognitive.  
We found that our participants’ timing decisions were near-optimal, whether they 
were making decisions on the basis of perceptual or cognitive information. They were 
able to take both task difficulty and the reward structure into account. We even 
demonstrated that the ability to take task difficulty into account was dynamical, that is, 
could be made on a trial-by-trial basis. However, because only decisions about time 
were studied, the possibility remained that the good performance across “modalities” 
was due to timing decisions being special. Another aspect of this paradigm was that it 
provided no direct comparison of decisions based on numerical probabilities and 
probabilities derived through low-level experience (or for that matter high-level 
experience). In other words, not only was the type of decision restricted to the time 
domain, Chapter 4 also left open the possibility that decisions based on internal 
estimates of probabilities are optimal (whether cognitive or perceptual), whereas 
decisions based on numerical probabilities are not (but see e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009).  
The final study we reported on (Chapter 6) was designed to address these 
potential issues. Here participants first learned about their own task performance for a 
perceptuo-motor and for a cognitive task. They then had to make decisions on the basis 
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of this task knowledge. Specifically, they had to make three types of decisions: 
decisions based on numerical probabilities, and decisions for which numerical 
probabilities and been replaced with the equivalent perceptuo- motor and cognitive 
information. Under such conditions, choice efficiencies were equally high across the 
three types of decisions. Thus, when decision tasks have been carefully matched, 
perceptual and cognitive performance appears equally good – suggesting that the 
perception-cognition gap is illusory.  
As was pointed out throughout, there are many differences across low-level and 
classical decision-making paradigms. The former tends to, for example, include 
feedback and real payoffs. Any or all of the differences could potentially explain the 
perception-cognition gap (as observed elsewhere). Of course, given that we observed no 
gap, we might appear none the wiser as to the true cause of the “gap”. However, in 
Chapter 6, we also showed that participants appeared to sub-optimally weight 
probabilities across both low- and high-level tasks. This sub-optimality implies that the 
most likely explanation for the perception-cognition gap lies in the use of different 
performance standards across different literatures.  
Thus, the perception-cognition gap probably arose because people were 
comparing actual performance in low-level tasks to whether or not deviations from 
optimality could be detected in high-level tasks. In other words, the apparent perception-
cognition gap has arisen because people contrasted different types of studies asking 
different types of questions.  
In summary, whether or not we view people’s decisions as good or bad seems to 
depend crucially on the performance criteria we apply.  It appears that only when 
performance criteria and decision tasks are mismatched can one create the illusion of a 
gap. As long as one consistently applies the same performance criteria across matched 
tasks ones finds very little evidence for a perception-cognition gap.  
 
7.2 The optimality of human decision-making 
What, if anything, do our results imply for questions about optimality and 
rationality in general? Researchers interested in questions about human rationality seem 
to slot neatly into two categories. Some believe that humans are optimal/rational and 
others that humans are sub-optimal/irrational. Both categories of researchers use 
empirical studies to support their arguments. Generally, the studies purport to show 
either surprisingly good performance, or surprisingly bad performance. We are to be 
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impressed or shocked by how good or bad decision makers humans are (for a 
particularly heated debate see Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996).   
Nevertheless, a third perhaps slightly less exciting story is conceivable. Perhaps 
humans are neither precisely rational nor precisely irrational.  In Chapter 2, 4 and 6 we 
consistently found highly efficient choices. Yet, in the same chapters we also showed 
that deviations from optimal strategies were detectable. These results might be taken to 
suggest that human choice fairly closely approximates the optimal solution, yet is not 
fully optimal.  
The efficiency metric is interesting precisely because it produces a gradient of 
rationality – not a binary optimal/sub-optimal categorization. Across the three chapters 
efficiencies have generally been in the .9 to 1 range. Clearly, one needs to compare 
efficiencies across studies with care. For example, the efficiency metric in Chapter 4 
(time study) was such that an efficiency of 1 was the maximum achievable efficiency. 
In contrast, in Chapter 2 the optimal efficiency was distributed around 1, and greater 
efficiency than 1 was achievable. Nevertheless, the high efficiency across three quite 
different decision paradigms, in which the decision itself was quite different (Chapter 
2– target/aim point choice; Chapter 4 – timing decisions; Chapter 6 – classical binary 
choices between pairs of options) might suggest that human choice in general is quite 
good.  
There are two caveats to this story. One is that we have studied human behaviour 
in fairly constrained and simple laboratory tasks. Thus, we have not shown that human 
choice approximates optimal solutions more generally. One of the complaints against 
applying optimal standards (here expected utility theory) is that they do not scale very 
well (Gigerenzer, 2008). Thus, it is possible, for example, that highly efficient 
behaviour breaks down in more complex situations. On the other hand, our constrained 
and simple tasks employed arbitrary and relatively artificial reward structures (i.e., cost 
functions) making them in some ways more difficult than “everyday” tasks.  
Clearly, for some tasks “optimal” solutions are implausible. For example, having 
a completely pair-wise consistent belief structure is computationally intractable 
(Nickerson, 2008). However, the mere fact that such tasks are implausible suggests that 
the rationality standards themselves are inadequate. If it would take one longer than 
one’s life time to do one consistency check across all one’s beliefs – then clearly this is 
not something one should do. From a decision theoretic perspective, the cost of making 
those checks will make them irrational. That is the cost function constrains what should 
be considered rational or not.  
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The other caveat is that whilst one might argue that ~90 – 95% absolute efficiency 
is rather good, clearly, if your stocks could return 100% but through sub-optimal 
management only returned 95% you might not be entirely happy (perhaps more so if 
100% was break even and 95% was a 5% yearly loss).  
Taken at face value however, the highly efficient behaviour of our participants 
raises questions about the processes underlying their behaviour. To what extent can 
people’s behaviour be described as a result due to as-good-as-it-gets engineering 
solutions to difficult problems? Whether such models, or models based on sub-optimal 
solutions to hard problems (Gigerenzer, 2008), best account for human behaviour is 
arguably an open question.  
  
7.3 Future directions 
 Both imaging (e.g., fMRI and MEG) and computational modelling seems to be 
on the rise in the study of the human mind. The relatively new “field” of 
neuroeconomics (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr & Poldrack, 2009) is but one example of 
this. New ways of analysing imaging data and new imaging technologies together with 
the wider use of modelling raises the interesting possibility that advances will be made 
because behavioural data, models and imaging data can act as mutual constraints - each 
constraining the other in order to create better  theories.   
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8. Supplemental materials 
8.1 Chapter 2 – Supplementary materials 
8.1.1 Movement & reaction time analyses 
Here we break down the response times into its two separate components: reaction 
time and movement time and analyse them separately.  
 
 
Fig S2.1. Movement time: group averages and individual movement time as a function 
of target distance, target size and experiment. The dashed line represents small targets 
and the full line represents large targets. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals useful 
for within-subject comparisons.   
 
8.1.1.1 Movement time. As can be seen in Fig. S2.1, movement times show 
approximately the same pattern as the response times reported on in Chapter 2. When 
participants point to far targets they use more time than when pointing to near targets 
(Experiment 1: (F(1,7) = 120.68, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .95, Experiment 2: F(2, 14) = 289.28, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .98). Recall that the time available for each pointing movement was the 
same regardless of distance. If participants had used nearly all the available response 
time (550 ms) to point at targets, the plots in Fig. S2.1 would have been horizontal lines. 
Faster movement times for near targets suggest that movements to near targets were 
faster than necessary. Another interesting trend is that participants moved more slowly 
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towards small targets than they did to large targets (Experiment 1: F(1, 7) = 21.31, p = 
.002, ηp
2
 = .75, Experiment 2: F(1,7) = 41.81, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .86 ). Given the speed-
accuracy trade-off (Fitts, 1954; Schmidt et al., 1979) this also suggests that people were 
sacrificing precision for movement speed.  In Experiment 1 there was also a significant 
interaction F(1, 7) = 9.54, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .58), whereas in Experiment 2 it did not reach 
significance (F(2, 14) = 41.81, p = .09,  ηp
2
 = .29).  
 
 
 
Fig S2.2. Reaction time: group averages and individual reaction time as a function of 
target distance, target size and experiment. The dashed line represents small targets and 
the full line represents large targets. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals useful for 
within-subject comparisons.   
 
8.1.1.2 Reaction time. Reaction times for most participants show the opposite, 
albeit weaker, trend to that of movement time (Fig. S2.2). Firstly, reaction time 
decreases with increases in target distance (Experiment 1: F(1,7) = 11.32, p = .012, ηp
2
 
= .62, Experiment 2: F(2, 14) = 20.01, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .74). Thus, participants to some 
extent appear to trade off movement time with response time, initiating movements 
faster to targets that are far away. Secondly, for some participants reaction times to 
small targets are faster than reaction times to large targets. This trend was significant in 
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Experiment 2 (F(1, 7) = 8.125, p = .025, ηp
2
= .54) and marginal in Experiment 1 (F(1, 7) 
= 4.92, p = .06, ηp
2
 = .41). In Experiment 1 there was also a significant interaction 
(F(1,7) = 5.72, p = .048, ηp
2
 = .45), whereas none was detected in Experiment 2 (F(2,14) 
= .376, p = .693, ηp
2 
= .05). 
 
8.1.2 Control experiment 
Here we give brief details on the small control study reported on in the General 
discussion. Only substantial deviations from Experiment 1 and 2 are noted. 
8.1.2.1 Participants & instructions. Five participants took part. All participants 
(except Participant 2 who was the author) were paid at an hourly rate of £10. 
Participants were informed that speeded motor movements are variable and that even if 
one aims for the same spot on each reach the actual end point will deviate randomly 
from trial to trial. They were further informed about the difference between accuracy 
and precision. Participants were instructed to minimize the distance between each end 
point and the perceived target centre. All participants (except Participant 2) were naive 
as to the purpose of the study.  
8.1.2.2 Stimuli, Experimental Design and Procedure. On each trial, one target 
disc was displayed to the left of the dock at a distance of ~9.2 cm (340 pixels) at one of 
five angles (-15° , -7.5° , 0° , +7.5° , +15°). Targets were either small (radius ~2.9mm / 
11 pixels) or large (radius ~5.9 mm / 22 pixels) yellow discs.  On each trial a random 
target size and target angle was selected for presentation. In total, 300 small and 300 
large non-late and non-anticipatory trials were collected. 
Participants received feedback identical to that in Experiment 1 and 2 on where 
they hit the screen (but did not receive any points for hitting the targets as we wanted to 
minimize the incentive for satisficing).  
8.1.2.3 Data analysis & Results. For each participant we collapsed across target 
angle, creating one small target and one large target distribution (see Gordon et al., 
1994). On a group level, there was a small but detectable effect of target size on 
movement time (t(4) = 4.18, p = .014, mean difference = 4.2 ms), indicating that 
movements to smaller targets were slower than movements to large targets. We did not 
detect an effect of target size on either movement time or reaction time (t(4) = 1.02, p = 
.37, mean difference = 1.6 ms;  t(4) = 2.51, p = .066 , mean difference = 5.9 ms).  
We compared each participant’s movement variability for small targets to their 
movement variability for large targets using un-paired t-tests. The t-statistic was used to 
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derive JZS Bayes Factors (Rouder et al., 2009), which allow inferences in favour of the 
null as well as in favour of the alternative hypothesis.  
Three of five participants reached with equal precision to small and large targets 
(JZS Bayes Factors > 3) and the evidence for two of five participants was inconclusive. 
If one performs the same analyses on the data for Experiment 1 and 2, the results are 
markedly different – most participants reached with greater precision to small targets 
(12 of 16, JZS Bayes factors < 0.33) and only three of twelve participants reach with 
equal precision to small and large targets (JZS Bayes Factor > 3). A group-level 
analysis provides similar evidence, showing that participants had a lower average 
difference (between small and large targets) in movement variability compared to those 
in Experiment 1 and 2 (t(19) = 3.86, p = .001, mean difference = 1.33)22.  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
22
 A reviewer questioned whether precision differences may be affected by target distance (in Experiment 
3 one mid-distance was used, whereas Experiment 1 and 2 used two and three different target distances 
respectively). As a control, we therefore fit bivariate Gaussians to the mid-distance data in Experiment 2 
(the same distance as used here). The parameters of these maximum-likelihood fits were used to simulate 
participants in Experiment 2 reaching, the same number of times as here, to mid-distance targets only. 
Even when distance and sample size has been equated, the average precision difference between small 
and large targets is larger in Experiment 2 than here (t(11) = 3.74, p = .003, mean difference = .96).  
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8.2 Chapter 4 – Supplementary materials 
8.2.1 SI Methods: Fitting the Weibull function to accuracy data 
In fitting the Weibull function we generally follow Wichmann and Hill
 
(2001)
 
as 
described below. To model accuracy, as a function of time spent on a given task, we use 
the generic psychophysical model:  
 
),;()1(),,,;();(  xFxx θ      SI Eq. 4.1 
 
Here, the model );( θx specifies the relationship between the probability of responding 
correctly, p, and the response time imposed x. The shape of the underlying function is 
determined by the parameters α, β, γ, λ and function F. The third and fourth parameters 
(, λ) determine the lower and the upper bound respectively. Here γ = .5. Parameter λ 
was free but constrained (see below for details). This corresponds to a flat Bayesian 
prior on λ in the constrained range. For F we choose the Weibull function: 
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We fit the model, as described by the parameter vector , to individual 
data using a maximum likelihood approach. We define three vectors, n, y, and x, each of 
length K (the number of blocks of data collected in the assessment phase of the 
experimental session). Vector n describes the number of trials in each block. The data 
are described in the vector y which records the proportion of correct responses in each 
of the K blocks of data. Vector x is defined as the response time (deadline) which was 
fixed within each block but varied across blocks. The likelihood of the data given the 
model is then defined as 
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Maximising the likelihood, L, is equivalent to minimising the quantity l such that: 
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SI Eq. 4.4 was minimised using a global optimisation algorithm (GlobalSearch, 
Matlab). The first three parameters in the model were constrained as follows: αmin = .01, 
αmax = 5000, βmin = .01, βmax = 500, γ = .5. For most stimuli asymptotic performance 
near 100% correct was likely. In such cases, asymptotic performance was constrained to 
lie in the 95-100% correct range (λmin = 0, λmax = .05) (Wichmann & Hill, 2001). For 
difficult tasks, in which asymptotic performance is likely to lie outside this range, we 
separately estimated asymptotic performance (120 trials under accuracy maximization 
instructions). This data was used to obtain a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the 
95% confidence interval of asymptotic performance, which was used as lower and 
upper limit for λ for these tasks, whenever the achieved accuracy for the longest 
imposed response time was lower than .95. Due to missing data, Participant 2 in 
Experiment 4 is an exception to this. However, this participant reached a high accuracy 
even for the hard tasks (standard intervals [0-.05] for λ were applicable). 
Allowing asymptotic values other than full accuracy generally produced 
satisfactory results. However, for Participant 1, in Exp. 1 there were a few local minima 
for the hard task. The global minimum essentially resulted in a step-function (very large 
β) , whereas a local minimum resulted in slopes similar to other observers’ slopes. We 
elected to present the latter. Note - the qualitative result (that this participant deviates 
from optimality) does not change if the global-minimum function is used. Participant 
6’s function for the easy motion discrimination task in Exp 4 was also step-like. This fit, 
however, was stable and therefore presented as found. 
 
8.2.2 SI Methods: Assessing goodness of fit 
Deviance  
 
               
  
  
                  
     
     
          SI Eq. 4.5 
 
was used as a metric of goodness of fit
 
(Wichmann & Hill, 2001).
 
For each function that 
was fit (N=61), an empirical deviance score was computed using the recorded data and 
the best fit function (derived using methods outlined “Fitting the Weibull function to 
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accuracy data” above). This empirical deviance score was compared to a distribution of 
simulated deviance scores. For each data set, the best fit function was used as a 
generating function for new data sets (N = 10 000). For each simulated data set, a 
function was fit and deviance was computed. This procedure results in a distribution of 
deviances, against which the empirical deviance can be compared. If the empirical 
deviance lay outside the 97.5
th
 percentile of this distribution data sets were classed as 
unlikely to have been generated by the best fit function.  
Fig. S4 M1 shows the critical deviance of these distributions as a function of the 
empirical deviance, for all functions that were fit. Data points that lie above the identity 
line are data sets for which we failed to reject the hypothesis that the data sets were not 
generated by the best fit function. Data points that lie below the identity line suggest 
that the best fit function is an unlikely generator of the data. As can be seen, the 
majority (56 of 61) of best fit functions were not classed as unlikely to have generated 
the data sets. 
 
 
Fig. S4 M1. Model fits. 97.5 percentiles of the simulated deviance distributions as a 
function of the empirical deviances. Points above the identity line represent data sets for 
which we failed to reject the alternative hypothesis of a poor fit. 
 
8.2.3 SI Methods: Additional details 
8.2.3.1 Apparatus. Stimuli were viewed binocularly on a CRT with a red filter 
(1024 pixels x 768 pixels, 100 Hz) in a dark room (viewing distance 70 cm). Custom 
software (C++, OpenGL) displayed the stimuli, which was drawn in red. Participants 
responded by pressing buttons on a trackball. 
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8.2.3.2 Stimuli types & Tasks: direction discrimination. Random-dot patterns 
(see Shadlen & Newsom, 2001 for the algorithm) composed of dots were drawn on a 
black background within a circular aperture (visual angle = 19°), with a fixation dot (of 
different luminance). On each trial, the coherently moving dots moved (2 pixels/frame) 
left or right (with equal probability). Participants made left/right judgments (left button 
mapped to left movement). Dot coherences (proportion of dots moving coherently in 
one direction) varied across experiments and conditions.  
In Exp. 3 the dot coherence was .3. We noticed large individual differences; with 
Participant 2 not reaching ~100% accuracy (we increased coherence for this participant 
to .5). For this reason, we tweaked the stimuli by increasing the dot density (Exp. 1-2 & 
4: 160 dots/frame; Exp. 3: 80dots/frame). In experiments in which task difficulty was 
manipulated (Exp 1 and 4), dot coherence for the easy condition was .7 and dot 
coherence for the hard condition .2 (see SI Methods: Fitting the Weibull function to 
accuracy data for how the asymptote was allowed to vary beyond the standard 5% error 
rate for the latter condition). In Experiment 2 where difficulty was not manipulated dot 
coherence was .25. 
8.2.3.3 Stimuli types & Tasks: mental arithmetic. Two numbers were 
presented centrally on each trial (~8° visual angle). Numbers were sampled from a 
uniform distribution (range 1 – 99), conditional on the sum of the numbers not being 
100 and the absolute difference between the sum and 100, not being greater than 10.  
Participants judged whether the sum of the two numbers was smaller (left button) or 
larger (right button) than 100. In Exp. 4 the easy condition was created by sampling 
with a more limited precision (i.e., in 5’s rather than 1’s, e.g., [65, 30] vs. [66, 33]).   
8.2.3.4 Stimuli types & Tasks: mental rotation. Two three-dimensional 
objects, composed of 10 cubes joined together (standard mental rotation figures, see 
Shepard & Metzler, 1967), were presented side by side (perspective projection). After 
both objects were given the same random orientations, one object was rotated by an 
additional 60° along its vertical axis. On each trial, objects were made impossible to 
align with a 50% chance. 
8.2.3.5 Procedure. As sessions were completed on different days, experimental 
sessions began with some warm-up trials (10-30 depending on experiment) with no time 
limit, no rewards/penalties, and with auditory feedback to remind participants of the 
stimulus-response mappings. The N for each deadline in the assessment staged ranged 
from 60 to 100 (opportunistically) across experiments. In Experiment 3, responses that 
differed by ±150 ms relative to deadline were re-run. As forced response times 
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increased, participants found it increasingly difficult to meet the same tight deadline. 
The tendency for increased variability with increased response times has been 
documented previously (Mates, Radil, Mueller & Poeppel, 1994). To avoid frustrating 
participants the deadline criteria for slower forced response times were relaxed in later 
experiments. Specifically: in Experiment 1, 2 and 4 the deadline limits were as follows: 
deadline < 1000 ms = ±100 ms, 1000 < deadline < 2500 = ±150 ms and deadline > 2500 
= ±200 ms.  
 
8.2.4 SI Methods: Mathematical formulation of the decision problem 
 We express the decisions made by our participants as choices between infinitely 
many lotteries (one for each possible average response time) with two possible 
outcomes. For a given average response time, RT, the associated lottery, L(RT), is 
defined as:  
 
                                            SI Eq. 4.6  
 
The outcome o1, is the penalty associated with responding incorrectly, occurring with 
conditional probability           and outcome o2 is the reward associated with 
responding correctly, occurring with conditional probability             
         . The expected value EV(RT) for a given response time RT can then be 
expressed as: 
 
                 
 
           SI Eq. 4.7 
    
The           are determined from the best fit Weibull function to the data obtained in 
the assessment stage.  
Given the inter-stimulus interval, I, and the total time available in which to 
complete tasks, T, for each observer we can calculate the average number of responses, 
N, made in the time available as: 
 
      
 
    
        SI Eq. 4.8 
 
We can then calculate the overall expected gain, G, of each participant as the product of 
N and EV. 
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        SI Eq. 4.9 
  
We defined efficiency, E(R) as a re-scaled expression of the overall expected gain 
over the range 100ms-5000ms, which is a reasonable time-span given the experimental 
parameters. The efficiency is computed as: 
 
      
                        
                                      
      SI Eq. 4.10 
  
The optimal response time is the particular response time which maximizes efficiency 
over this range.  
For Experiment 4, SI Eq. 4.9 was extended to take into account the dependence 
between easy (RT1) and hard (RT2) choices performed in the same period (T). Outcomes 
and conditional probabilities for RT1 are as above, and RT2 is also associated with a 
positive (o3) and a negative (o4) outcome and their respective conditional probabilities. 
SI Eq. 10 was extended similarly.  
 
          
 
       
 
   
           
 
        SI Eq. 4.11 
 
Due to the experimental design (unpredictable trial-by-trial changes in task 
difficulty together with self-paced trial display) we were unable to match the number of 
hard and easy trials a priori. Thus, SI Eq. 4.11 holds in terms of expectation only.  
Across observers in Experiment 4 the proportion of experienced easy trials was .5026 
(total N = 2505), the maximum likelihood 95 percentile of this estimate is .48 – .52. The 
percentiles for estimates for individual observers similarly cover .5. Consequently, 
although the frequency of easy and hard trials was not precisely matched the counts 
were similar. Therefore, it does not seem inappropriate to define the expected gain using 
SI Eq. 4.11. 
 
8.2.5 SI Methods:  Extrapolation from Weibull fits to choice data 
To assess whether there were systematic differences between predicted- and 
actual accuracy, we compared the predicted accuracy, for all response time choices, to 
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the actual accuracy. This comparison is shown in Fig. S4 M2 and was made across all 
experiments, tasks, conditions and participants – in total 121 accuracy and predicted 
accuracy pairs (this also includes data from a reward manipulation for the mental- 
arithmetic and rotation tasks, not reported on in the main paper, but reported in Fig. 
S4.5). As can be seen the distribution of differences (predicted-obtained) is captured by 
a Gaussian centred near 0 – indicating that predicted accuracies do not systematically 
deviate from obtained accuracies (and that the psychometric functions therefore provide 
unbiased estimates of accuracy as a function of response time). 
 
 
Fig. S4 M2. Differences between predicted accuracy and obtained accuracy 
(ΔAccuracy) across all experiments, conditions and observers (N=121). The line is a 
Gaussian fit to the data (MLE), with parameters μ = -.002 and σ = .055. The 95% 
confidence interval on μ was -.012 to .008 (σ = .049 to .063).  
 
8.2.6 SI Methods: Was the hard-easy manipulation successful? 
Visual comparison of hard and easy accuracy functions suggested that all task 
difficulty manipulations were successful (e.g., see Fig. 2A). We tested whether the 
apparent differences were significant with a Monte Carlo hypothesis test under the null 
hypothesis that the hard and easy data sets were generated by a common underlying 
function (MLE fit to the combined hard-easy data set). That is, the empirical difference 
between the best-fit parameters for the hard- and easy task was evaluated against a null 
distribution of parameter differences, under the assumption that both the hard- and easy 
data sets were generated by the same underlying function. 
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 Briefly, hard- and easy data sets were combined into joint data sets. Each 
combined data set was fit, and the best fit functions were used to generate 2 x 10 000 
data sets (one vector for easy- and one for hard tasks). Each of these data sets was fit 
anew. The difference between the resulting best fit parameter vectors ( D(αΔ, βΔ, λΔ) =  
E(αeasy, βeasy, λeasy) - H(αhard, βhard, λhard) ) is the null-distribution. The differences between 
the empirical hard- and easy parameter vectors, of functions fit to the original hard- and 
easy data sets, were then evaluated against a three-dimensional kernel density estimate 
of this null-distribution. If the empirical difference was unlikely given the null-
distribution (p < .05) then the two functions were classed as different. By this criterion, 
15 of 18 hard-easy accuracy function-pairs had statistically different parameters. 
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8.2.7 Fig. S4.1.  
 
 
Fig. S4.1Efficiency functions for data reported in Fig 2C. Efficiency function for easy- 
(blue) and hard (black) motion discrimination, with average response times (circles) 
including bootstrapped 95% CI’s, for participant 1-6 (A-F). For participant 6, the inset 
shows a zoomed in image of the peaks. As can be seen, participants always shifted in 
the right direction for the hard blocks relative to the easy blocks (i.e., slowed down). For 
most participants, responses were also near the peak of the functions. We confirmed that 
choices (circles) were closer to the appropriate efficiency function peak than they were 
to the wrong efficiency function peak (t(5) = -3.21, p = .024). Similarly, a simple linear 
model (with two multivariate outliers deleted: Mahalanobis distance Chi-Square 
criterion of p > .01), of choices and peaks which assumes that participants base their 
choices on the correct efficiency function peaks, fits the data well (r(8) = .78, p = .008,). 
A model assuming that participants base their choices on the wrong efficiency function 
peaks , on the other hand, fits the data less well (r(8) = .15, p = .69).  
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8.2.8 Fig. S4.2 
 
Fig. S4.2. Response time choices for the initial reward structure manipulation. White 
symbols correspond to timing choices for the three conditions. Gray triangles 
correspond the optimal response time for each condition and participant. The distance of 
the actual choice (white symbols) to the gray triangle is a measure of how far away from 
optimal participants choices are. All error bars are bootstrapped 95% CI’s. Some error 
bars are too small to be visible at this scale. 
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8.2.9 Fig. S4.3  
 
Fig. S4.3. Efficiency functions for data reported in Fig S4.2. Efficiency functions for 
participant 1 – 5 (rows), for the neutral (black), the penalty only (blue) and the no-
penalty (red) condition, with average response times (circles). Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% CI’s (barely visible at this scale) 
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8.2.10 Fig. S4.4 
 
Fig S4.4. Response time choices for the between-subject penalty magnitude manipulation. White symbols correspond to timing choices for the four 
penalty levels. Gray symbols correspond the optimal choices for each condition and participant. The distance of the actual choice (white symbols) to 
the gray symbols is a measure of how far away from optimal participants choices are. All error bars are bootstrapped 95% CI’s.  
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8.2.11 Fig. S4.5 
 
Fig. S4.5. Cognitive task efficiency functions for the pilot reward structure 
manipulation. Mental arithmetic (A) and mental rotation (B), for participant 1 – 5 
(rows), for each condition: neutral (black), penalty-only (blue) and reward-only (red). 
As can be seen, the effect of choosing sub-optimally is minor for the penalty-only 
condition. Participants shift their response times sufficiently far given the flatness of the 
efficiency functions (except Participant 3, who is consistently aggressive across each 
task and reward structure [as they were for the motion discrimination task, see Fig. 
S4.4]). However, the sub-optimal response time shifts for the reward-only task (red) 
now become consequential: with many participants now earning less than 50% of the 
maximum earnings (i,e., the optimal response for the reward-only condition has now 
become as extreme as for the penalty-only condition). This is due to the relative flatness 
of the underlying time-accuracy functions (compared to motion discrimination) and due 
to, relative to the asymptote of the time-accuracy function (and hence relative to the 
motion discrimination task), the short inter-stimulus interval (for a related point see, 
Green, 1960; Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1968). 
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8.3 Chapter 6 – Supplementary materials 
8.3.1 SI Additional methods: Model fitting  
As noted in Chapter 6, the space of possible cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992) parameterizations is large. It is arguably not feasible to search the 
entire space. Instead we picked three model parameterizations: the original 
parameterization (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) with a choice function, the 
parameterization recommended by Stott (2006, the one reported in Chapter 6) and Wu 
et al.’s (2009) parameterization. To ensure that the effect of particular aspects of each 
parameterization was balanced we fit a full factorial combination of the 
parameterizations of these three models. As outlined in Table S1 below, this procedure 
resulted in 8 different model parameterizations.  
 
Table S1. Illustration of the combinations of cumulative prospect theory 
parameterizations that was fit.  
Nr Value function Probability function Choice Function Noise type 
1 Power Prelec Wu et al. Proportional 
2 Power Prelec Logistic Proportional 
3 Power Prelec Wu et al. Constant 
4 Power Prelec Logistic Constant 
5 Power Kahneman & Tversky Wu et al. Proportional 
6 Power Kahneman & Tversky Logistic Proportional 
7 Power Kahneman & Tversky Wu et al. Constant 
8 Power Kahneman & Tversky Logistic  Constant 
 
In the following we will use x and p to denote values and probabilities 
respectively. The three target model parameterizations all use the same power function 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) use. Because we used only non-negative values (x ≥ 0) we 
estimate α (and not λ or β): 
 
       
         
             
 ,      SI Eq. 1 
 
The original probability weighting function considered by Tversky & Kahneman 
(1992) is: 
 
110 
 
      
  
               
,       SI Eq. 2 
 
For γ > 1 low probabilities are underweighted and for γ < 1 low probabilities are 
overweighted.  
Prelec’s (1998) one-parameter probability weighting function, recommended by 
Stott (2006) and fit by Wu et al. (2009) is: 
 
              
         SI Eq. 3 
 
As above, γ > 1 implies underweighting and γ < 1 implies overweighting.  
A choice function maps properties of prospects onto choice probabilities. Stott 
(2006) recommends a logistic choice function. The probability of choosing prospect B, 
when faced with the choice between it and prospect A, for the logistic function is: 
 
    
 
               
,        SI Eq. 4 
 
The probability of choosing prospect A is 1-PB.Parameter k in this function can be 
thought of as a noise parameter. The lower k is the worse we become at discriminating 
between the two prospects. This way of modelling choice is typically combined with the 
assumption that the noise (k) is constant across all prospect pairs. 
 Wu et al. (2009) instead model noise as proportional to the prospects. They 
introduced proportional error by modelling each prospect as a random variable with a 
variance dependent on the prospect and a constant k. For example, prospect B can be 
expressed as                                . The difference between two 
such prospects, or random variables, is another random variable (Δ            , 
with variance equal to the sum of the variance of the two independent variables σ2Δ = 
σ2B + σ
2
A. The probability of choosing prospect B then is the integral of Δ from 0 to 
negative infinity: 
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      
   
 
  
 
  
,      SI Eq. 5 
 
The probability of choosing prospect A is 1-PB. 
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Thus Stott and Wu et al. recommend/use different choice functions and model 
noise in different ways. To model constant noise for Wu et al.’s choice function we 
made the variance of the choice variable independent of the prospects (e.g.,       
               . To model proportional noise for the logistic choice function we 
modelled the prospects as random variables (as Wu et al. did) and made the parameter k 
equal to the precision (1/ σ2Δ) of the choice variable.  These parameterizations were 
combined as noted in Table S1 above. 
We fit the above eight parameterizations to individual participants’ choices 
separately for each task by maximum likelihood methods using Matlab’s Multistart 
solver (using 3000 solvers). As Wu et al. (2009), we denote a choice of prospect A as r 
and a choice of prospect B as 1-r. We minimized the negative log-likelihood of the 
value weight (α), the probability weight (γ) and the noise weight (k) given participants 
choices: 
 
                           
 
                 )  SI Eq. 6 
 
We constrained the probability and value parameters in the above functions to lie 
between .01 and 100; a range sufficient to capture both extreme under and 
overweighting. The proportional noise parameter was constrained to lie between 1e-10 
and 100. The constant noise parameter was constrained to lie between 0 and 500 (for 
Wu et al.’s choice function the minimum was always 1e-10, whereas for the logistic 
function the minimum was 0). The difference between the ranges for the noise 
parameters is due to the proportionality of the proportional error model. Constraining 
the parameters as above is equivalent to applying a uniform Bayesian prior over the 
constrained ranges. As long as the constraints are reasonable, constraining the 
parameters will improve the speed at which global optima can be found with no ill 
effects. 
Thus to ensure that the results reported on in the main paper were not due to the 
fitting of a specific parameterization of cumulative prospect theory, we fit the eight 
parameterizations just outlined. The results of this exercise are shown in Fig. SM6.1 
below.  
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Fig. SM6.1 Best fit value and probability weights for eight different parameterizations 
of cumulative prospect theory. The Y-axes show the average (50% trimmed mean) of 
the logarithm of the value (Row 1) and the probability (Row 2) weights. A log weight of 
0 implies that participants were on average unbiased (had weights of 1). A log 
probability weight below 0 implies overweighting of low probabilities (as typical in 
classical tasks) and a log probability weight above 0 implies underweighting of 
probabilities (as typical in decisions from experience). The logarithm of the parameter is 
appropriate as it emphasizes under- and overweighting to an equal degree. The X-axis 
maps onto specific cumulative prospect theory parameterizations (see Table S1 for a 
key). Black full lines show average best-fit weights to objective probabilities. Red 
dashed lines show average best-fit weights to subjective probabilities.  
 
As can be seen (Fig. SM6.1), nearly all parameterizations show the same 
qualitative pattern: When objective probabilities are modelled (black discs, full lines), 
average probability weights for decisions based on numerical probabilities (classical) 
and those based on internal estimates of probabilities (perceptuo-motor and arithmetic) 
dissociate. For classical decisions average log probability weights are negative but for 
arithmetic and for perceptuo-motor decisions the average weights are positive. 
However, when subjective probabilities are fit (red discs, dashed lines) average 
probability weights show the same qualitative pattern across all three decision types. 
That is, when subjective probabilities are modelled the average participant overweights 
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small probabilities - regardless of task (i.e., has negative log-probability weights). Thus, 
across eight cumulative prospect theory parameterizations the results in Fig. 6.3 and 
Fig. 6.5 replicate.  
  
114 
 
8.3.2 Fig. S6.1 
 
 
Fig. S6.1 Negative log-likelihoods for the within-between contrast. Left panel – full 
data set with three outliers identified (crosses are more than 2 inter-quartile ranges from 
the median). Right panel – data with the three outliers removed.  The left box plot in 
each panel shows the negative log-likelihoods for the within-task-across-participants-
predictions and the right box plot in each panel shows the across-tasks-within-
participants-predictions. 
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8.3.3 Fig. S6.2 
 
 
Fig. S6.2. Illustrations of perfect group-calibration with poor individual calibration. 
Three examples (one in each panel) with two participants who either show marked 
biases (Panel 1 & 3) or are very noisy (Panel 2) and yet give rise to perfect group-
calibration. That is, once the two lines have been averaged, the average would coincide 
with the identity line. Note, scales are arbitrary and lines were hand-drawn. 
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8.3.4 Fig. S6.3 
 
Fig. S6.3. Objective and subjective target widths as a function of hit probability for 
individual participants. The first panel in each pair shows calibration for the mental 
arithmetic task. The second panel in each pair shows calibration for the pointing task. 
Bold numbers correspond to participants. Black circles represent objective widths. That 
is, the target widths participants need to hit the targets with .05, .25, .5, .75 and .95 
probability respectively. The blue circles represent the average of participants 5 last (of 
6) width ratings. The red lines are extrapolations based on the Weibull function. Note, 
the y-axis scale differs from plot to plot.  
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8.3.5 Fig. S6.4 
 
Fig. S6.4. Group-level calibration. Plots obtained by first averaging over each subjects 5 
estimates for each of the 5 reference probabilities. This results in 18 estimates for each 
reference probability. These were mapped onto probability space and averaged to 
produce group-calibration curves.  
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8.3.6 Fig. S6.5 
 
 
Fig. S6.5. Negative log-likelihoods for objective- and subjective probability fits. 
Arithmetic and pointing fits are colour and shape coded. Each symbol is a fit to one 
participant’s data. The fit model is a simple expected value maximization model with 
proportional noise. As can be seen, most data points lie below the identity line 
indicating that probabilities in the form of our participants’ beliefs about their ability to 
hit targets (subjective) better account for the data than probabilities in the form of their 
actual ability to hit targets (objective).  
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8.3.7 Fig. S6.6 
 
 
Fig. S6.6. Mean response times (ms) as a function of decision type.  
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